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Technology development is an outcome of collective social processes among 
actors in different institutional fields. In the literature on technology development, 
there have been long debates regarding whether technology shapes social structure 
and order, or whether social forces determine the developmental trajectories of 
technology. From a series of studies, I seek to understand the social dynamics of 
technology development in order to address theoretical tensions, both theoretically 
and empirically. Three separate yet related studies together provide a theoretical 
model and relevant empirical evidence for the linkages among actors, institutional 
logics and technologies.  
In Chapter 1 I first attempt to theorize about how actors, including scientists, 
engineers and technology users, collectively shape technological evolution in the 
general technology context. Combining the two perspectives—institutional logics and 
collective actions, I develop a theoretical model that addresses how scientists and 
  
engineers, faced with multiple institutional logics, strategically respond to the 
multiple institutional logics, and how the different formation of institutional logics 
can systematically lead to different types of technology development. In the 
theoretical model, I discuss four distinctive social mechanisms of framing 
institutional logics—replacing, patching, sequencing, and reinforcing, and the 
relationships between the social mechanisms and the types of technology 
development. 
In Chapter 2, building upon the theoretical model proposed in Chapter 1, I 
empirically investigate the emergence and decline of electric and hybrid drives in the 
community of electric vehicle researchers from 1969-2009. Combining the 
perspectives of institutional logics and social movements, I argue that an institutional 
logic is a product of collective social processes among actors in different institutional 
fields, and that established logics play an integral role in shaping the differential 
development of new technology. Empirical findings suggest that environmental 
protests and economic recessions systematically influence technologists’ 
incorporation of two institutional logics (environmentalism vs. industrialism), and 
that social cohesion among actors within each institutional logic tends to shape 
differential developmental trajectories of electric and hybrid drives in the community 
of electric vehicle researchers.  
In Chapter 3 I further explore the process through which actors respond to 
multiple and conflicting institutional logics, suggesting that actors can purposefully 
create new concepts and meanings, modify meanings of institutional logics, or 
reinforce existing meanings. While existing institutional work has suggested and 
  
empirically demonstrated that institutional logics shape cognitive and behavioral 
patterns of actors, it still remains unanswered as to how actors can mobilize existing 
and new logics—differential decoupling processes. To trace the processes of 
constructing meanings of institutional logics, I conducted an inductive study by 
employing keyword-based, computer-aided text analysis of research proceedings 
published by the international Electric Vehicle Symposium in 1969 and in 1994. From 
the analysis, I identify four social mechanisms of logic construction: clarifying, 
patching, expanding and reinforcing. Moreover, empirical findings suggest that social 
mechanisms of patching, expanding and reinforcing are closely related to the 
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Chapter 1: Formation of Institutional Logics and Its 
Influence on New Technology Development 
 
The consensus prevailing in modern science is certainly remarkable. 
Consider the fact that each scientist follows his own personal 
judgement for believing any particular claim of science and each is 
responsible for finding a problem and pursuing it in his own way; and 
that each again verifies and propounds his own results according to 
his personal judgement. Consider moreover that discovery is 
constantly at work, profoundly remoulding science in each generation. 
And yet in spite of such extreme individualism acting in so many 
widely disparate branches, and in spite of the general flux in which 
they are all involved, we see scientists continuing to agree on most 
points of science. Even though controversy never ceases among them, 
there is hardly a question on which they do not agree after a few years 
discussion (Michael Polanyi 1946, pp. 50-51) 
 
 
Technology development is an outcome of collective activities among actors. 
In this chapter I discuss how actors—including scientists, engineers and technology 
users—collectively shape technological evolution. Borrowing from and combining 
the two theoretical lenses—collective actions and institutional logics, I develop a 
theoretical model that addresses how actors in the technological and sociocultural 
spheres collectively shape the formation of institutional logics, and how the different 
formation of institutional logics can systematically determine the types of technology 
development. One of the critical contributions of this study is that I bring actors and 
institutions back into the discussion of technology development. I discuss theoretical 
linkages from actors, via logic formation, to technology development. Another 
contribution of this study is that it bridges a gap between technological and 




technological and sociocultural spheres and theorize about how the two distinctive 
spheres simultaneously influence technological evolution. Finally, this study enriches 
current institutional arguments by showing how embedded agents collectively 
influence institutions, and at the same time are influenced by those institutions. This 
discussion will help us to better understand the dynamics of both institutional and 
technological changes. 
 
1. 1. Introduction 
The emergence of new technologies has been a topic of considerable interest 
to scholars from various disciplines, including sociology, economics and organization 
theory. The prevailing technology literature, in depicting the phenomenon of 
technological evolution, has centered on the roles of standardization (e.g., Farrell and 
Saloner 1985; Tassey 2000), on network externalities (e.g., Katz and Shapiro 1986; 
Khazam and Mowery 1994) and on technology life cycle (e.g., Anderson and 
Tushman 1990; Murmann and Frenken 2006; Suarez 2004). Economic models of 
technological development, for example, largely center on actors’ rational 
assessments of the benefits and costs of developing or adopting new technology, 
techno-economic attributes of technology leading to technological innovation, and the 
diffusion of new technology (see Roberts 2008 for a review). The underlying 
assumption of these models is that human agents pursue technical rationality and 
purposefully maximize economic efficiency, thereby suggesting that technological 




In contrast, the institutional perspective casts doubt on actors’ rational 
decision-making (Knight 1992; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Scott 1995). Rather, the 
institutional perspective accentuates cognitive limitations of actors when the actors 
attempt to assess the value of technology, and suggests that actors’ choices of 
technologies are largely confined by institutional constraints that shape cognitive and 
behavioral patterns of embedded actors (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Strang and 
Soule 1998). The bounded rationality assumption of actors explains the  reliance of 
actors on rules and principles that are socially and culturally proven to achieve 
technical rationality (Meyer and Rowan 1977). More recently, technology scholars 
have applied this perspective to gain an understanding of how broader institutions and 
institutional framework influence technology development (see Kaplan and Tripsas 
2008, for a review). 
While these two perspectives represent agency-based and structural views of 
technology, they both tend to overlook endogenous social and cultural processes 
which are often outside rational decision-making and also influence the trajectories of 
new technological development (e.g., Barley 1986; MacKenzie 1987; Orlikowski 
1992). Although a handful of research on strategic action discusses the positive role 
of actors’ strategic intention in shaping technical and institutional environments 
(DiMaggio 1988; Fligstein and McAdam 2011; Oliver 1991; Suchman 1995), 
theoretical development and subsequent empirical findings are as yet limited.  
The social constructivist view of technology, on the other hand, intimates that 
the development of technology is a product of actors’ collective interpretations of 




collective activities in technology evolution (e.g., Callon 1987; Pinch and Bijker 
1984). This view seeks to address collective social and cultural processes through 
which a particular technology emerges as a dominant design in the technology field. 
Subsequent empirical studies provide rich contextual descriptions of collective social 
processes associated with technology development (e.g., Grodal 2010; Kaplan and 
Murray 2010; O’Mahony and Bechky 2008). Although these studies help us better 
understand the social and cultural processes through which actors make sense of the 
meaning of new technology, this view has not yet addressed how social actors 
actively frame the interpretations of technology and how these framing processes 
influence technology development (See Kaplan and Murray 2010 for an exception). 
Moreover, much empirical work is confined to case studies or document 
analyses which inherently limit casual inferences. Particularly in the technology field 
where technologists constantly introduce a number of new technologies and enhance 
or destroy the existing technologies, the technologists inevitably encounter a lack of a 
consensus of the meaning and value of new technologies (Grodal 2010). It is 
therefore important to understand the social processes through which technologists 
develop shared understandings of new technology and determine future 
developmental trajectories of new technology. 
Technology development is indeed a cognitive and cultural process of 
destroying prevailing understandings of old technology and providing new concepts 
of technology. In considering the complex and dynamic features of technology 
evolution, a fundamental question still remains unanswered and debated: How do 




In order to better understand the complexity and dynamics of such a social 
phenomenon, research on technology should focus on the holistic aspect of 
technology development rather than on certain features of it. While early research 
into technology and entrepreneurship offers insights into how technological 
development can be a function of entrepreneurial actions and of the society’s stores of 
knowledge (e.g., Kirzner 1973; Romer 1990; Rosenberg 1982; Schumpeter 1934), 
endogenous processes of creating new scientific knowledge and technology remain 
largely under-theorized in the current studies of technology and entrepreneurship. 
Furthermore, there have been few theoretical and empirical efforts directed at 
exploring the collective social and cultural processes among actors who can 
potentially determine the trajectories of technology development. As a result, not 
enough is known regarding why some technologies survive and gain legitimacy but 
others do not; how entrepreneurial actors collectively shape and manage the disparate 
nature of technologies; and how actors’ collective beliefs—institutional logics (I will 
define this term in the later section)—systematically influence the technological 
choices of actors, both theoretically and empirically. 
Borrowing from theories of collective actions and institutional logics, in this 
chapter I therefore seek to provide a theoretical framework which accounts for (1) 
how technologists collectively frame multiple institutional logics in the technological 
community, and (2) how institutional logics associated with technologies can play an 
enabling or disabling role in technology development. With the theoretical model 
proposed in this study, I reintroduce and theorize about the middle-range social 




Ultimately, the model addresses why new technologies follow different 
developmental trajectories. 
 
1. 2. Technology, Institutions and Institutional Logic 
1. 2. 1. Technology 
Research on technology generally views technology as human production 
activities by which actors transform physical inputs into desired outputs (e.g., Hulin 
and Roznowski 1985; Thompson 1967). The concept of technology proposed by 
technology scholars is not necessarily limited to physical equipment, machines, tools, 
and instruments used in human production activities. The concept encompasses work 
processes, tasks, methods, skills and knowledge through which actors efficiently 
produce and reproduce desired outcomes (Perrow 1967; Schiffer 2001; Thompson 
1967).  
The technology literature has long discussed the origins and consequences of 
technological development. One line of technology studies has explored the 
endogenous processes of technological development, largely focusing on 
organizational and macro-economic factors that drive technological development 
(e.g., Romer 1990; Rosenberg 1976, 1982; Scherer 1965). It is now well-documented 
that R&D inputs, marketing efforts and administrative capabilities play integral roles 
in driving technological innovation and organizational growth (for a review see 
Cohen and Levin 1989). The economic models of technology primarily suggest that 
stocks of knowledge of organizations are crucial for technological development, and 




technological innovation (Romer 1990; Scherer 1967). The primary goal of the 
economic models is to identify antecedents potentially influencing technological 
innovation, and to estimate the relative impacts of the antecedents on innovative 
outcomes. Thus, the economic models still tend to treat scientific knowledge or 
technology as exogenously given, and thereby remain silent about the origins of 
knowledge or technology (Rosenberg 1982). 
Another line of studies on technology, led by the unique properties of 
technology in the organizational context, has examined structural outcomes 
(Galbraith 1977; Perrow 1967; Woodward 1965). In particular, early organizational 
theorists have noted that technological attributes—such as technical complexity, 
uncertainty and interdependence—are closely associated with levels of formalization 
and centralization of organizational structures (e.g., Thompson 1967). The empirical 
evidence that was discovered led them to conclude that technology constrains human 
activities and determines features of work processes and organizational structures 
(Perrow 1967; Thompson 1967; Woodward 1965). This insight has motivated a great 
number of subsequent empirical studies in which researchers continue to confirm a 
causal linkage between technology and organizational structure (e.g., Carter 1984; 
Harvey 1968). This stream of technology research has echoed technology 
determinism: technology shapes social structure and order. 
Therefore, despite the extensive work on the antecedents and consequences of 
technology, neither stream of research appropriately accounts for the origins of 
scientific knowledge known to serve as a major source of technological innovation—




system view of technology and technology determinism, a body of scholars contends 
that technology is indeed socially constructed (e.g., Callon 1987; Davis and Taylor 
1976; Hughes 1987; Pinch and Bijker 1984). They argue that technology is a product 
of social and political negotiations of actors (e.g., Pinch 1996). This social 
constructivist view of technology, rooted in the sociology of knowledge (Berger and 
Luckmann 1967; Foucault 1980; Mannheim 1936), has shifted the discussion of 
technological development from objective to subjective views of technology (e.g., 
Law 2000). Departing from the pursuit of exploring absolute truth, this subjective 
view of technology focuses on the social and cultural processes of producing 
scientific knowledge (Latour 1987). The tenet of the subjective view of technology is 
that scientific findings are indeed open to more than one interpretation. Thus, 
fundamental to this approach is how scientists and engineers with different 
interpretations deal with disagreements on scientific findings. 
Pinch and Bijker (1987), for example, accentuate the role of a set of relevant 
social groups, each of which shares the same interpretative schemes about a certain 
artifact or technology. They extended the subjective view of technology by 
incorporating the Empirical Programme of Relativism (EPOR) approach into the 
extant sociology of science and technology. Consistent with the subjective view of 
technology, the EPOR approach assumes that there is no single interpretation of 
scientific findings. This assumption motivates the exploration of the social aspect of 
scientific development. Social actors within the same social group tend to develop 
similar identities, share a similar technological culture (i.e., technical hobby) and 




the Pinch and Bijker (1987), differences in interpretative schemes across different 
social groups lead to controversies over technological problem-solving. Once social 
groups reach a consensus about the meanings of artifacts or at least believe potential 
problems associated with the artifacts to be solved, conflicts in the interpretations of 
the artifacts become stabilized, and technological controversies are resolved. 
Unlike Pinch and Bijker’s (1987) emphasis on the importance of social 
environments to problem-solving during the development of technology, Hughes 
(1987) views technology as a dynamic system that includes both technical and social 
environments where there are no social boundaries of disciplinary knowledge. He 
suggests that technological systems are comprised of all relevant components 
associated with technology—such as inventors, scientists, engineers, managers, 
financiers, workers and policymakers—and that these components are functionally 
interconnected. Similarly to Pinch and Bijker (1987), he regards technological 
development as a process that enables a system to achieve a new state of equilibrium. 
He however sees no clear distinction between technology and social domains; and he 
considers science, technology and the whole society to be tightly linked as a system. 
He argues that, consequently, the development of technology is not only driven by 
actors’ social engagement but also by changes in certain components of a system or 
imbalance within a system.  
Both Pinch and Bijker (1987) and Hughes (1987) implicitly concur that to be 
successful entrepreneurs, technology entrepreneurs who produce new scientific 
knowledge and technology should understand social values, culture and institutional 




Callon (1987) elaborates and extends the views of both Pinch and Bijker and 
Hughes regarding technology. He seeks to incorporate into technology studies an 
actor-networks argument. Like Hughes (1987), Callon (1987) also views actors as 
linked together within a seamless web. Heterogeneous actors are basic elements that 
constitute networks; and the networks include both human and nonhuman 
components. Actors share simple and common interpretations, and similar identity 
and mutual interests; and networks are the dynamic associations by which actors 
exchange information with other actors and continuously fill interpretive gaps among 
actors. This view of actor-networks describes the dynamics of interconnectedness 
within the whole society. The identity of actors and the mutual relationships among 
them are neither perfectly defined nor stable. Callon (1987, p. 93) argues that “an 
actor network is simultaneously an actor whose activity is networking heterogeneous 
elements and a network that is able to redefine and transform what it is made of.” 
Actors’ associations are continuously redefined. New elements can at any moment be 
assimilated into networks, a process which shifts the nature of actors’ identity. 
In sum, the main contributions of the social constructivist view of technology 
are (1) that it extends the extant argument of technology largely couched in the 
technical environments to the social environments; and (2) that it attempts to open the 
“black box” of how technology and scientific knowledge are generated, interpreted 
and developed. Contributions notwithstanding, subsequent empirical studies have 
been limited due to the difficulties in developing analytical tools or methods (for a 
discussion see Pinch 1996; Klein and Kleinman 2002). More recently, some scholars 




agency-based approach, it tends to overlook structural factors that can potentially play 
a central role in technological development (e.g., Klein and Kleinman 2002).  
 
1. 2. 2. Theoretical Debates between Technical and Institutional Fields 
Departing from the prevailing technology arguments, institutional theorists 
have long suggested the unique roles that institutions play in the technology context. 
Institutions are defined as supra-organizational patterns of practices which regulate 
behaviors of human agents (Friedland and Alford 1991; Hughes 1939; Jepperson 
1991; Scott and Meyer 1983). In the early neo-institutional models, the distinction 
between “technical” and “institutional” has become a central research agenda; the 
former represents the efficiency logic; and the latter represents the legitimacy logic 
(e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Kraatz and Zajac 1996; Orrù, Biggart, and 
Hamilton 1991; Scott and Meyer 1983; Tolbert and Zucker 1983).   
Neo-institutional theory proclaims that actors’ rational behaviors stem from 
their intention to conform to social rules and rituals that they believe to be rational 
and legitimate (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Phillips and Zuckerman 2001). The 
theory is based on a criticism of the traditional technical rationality argument which 
seeks to address organization-environment relationships, mainly in the context of 
technical environments. Neo-institutional theory puts more emphasis on institutional 
environments than on technical ones. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) note that in the 
early twentieth century, the bureaucratization and rationalization of organizational 
structures was developed as a means of efficient control of social actors. They view 




states. However, they raise a fundamental question: Why do bureaucratization and 
rationalization still occur, even without achieving any further efficiency? Challenging 
the notion of technical rationality, they propose that today’s bureaucratization may 
result not from the actors’ pursuit of internal efficiency but from institutional 
processes affected by the professions and the state. Echoing DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983), Scott and Meyer (1983) have also discussed the unique roles of institutional 
environments as distinct from technical environments. Within the technical 
environment, products and services are exchanged. The control mechanism in the 
technical environment is efficiency—whether actors can produce outputs in a more 
efficient way. In contrast, the institutional environment provides actors with rules and 
requirements to which they must conform. Thus, its control mechanism is 
legitimacy—whether actors receive support from the broader environment. 
Led by this insight, early studies that draw upon neo-institutional theory, have 
primarily attempted to find distinctive roles of institutions in the organizational fields 
(Singh, Tucker, and House 1986; Tolbert and Zucker 1983; Westphal, Gulati, and 
Shortell 1997). For example, Tolbert and Zucker (1983) in their two-stage diffusion 
model demonstrate that organization-specific technical and economical motivations 
lead to the early adoption; whereas organizations’ reliance on the benefits of 
legitimacy drives the later adoption. Similarly, Westphal, Gulati and Shortell (1997) 
reveal in their study of the adoption process of Total Quality Management (TQM) 
practices across hospitals that early adopters tend to customize TQM practices to 
local conditions in order to achieve efficiency gains; whereas late adopters adopt 




convention increases legitimacy among hospitals but decreases their internal 
efficiency.  
This two-stage diffusion model motivates a number of subsequent studies 
which investigate the effect of organizational heterogeneity on the diffusion of 
practices. The research, to date, has discovered that organizations’ network positions 
(Greenwood and Suddaby 2006; Kraatz 1998), geographical locations (Lounsbury 
2007) and social status (Kraatz 1998) influence their adoption of particular practices. 
Empirical findings strengthen the idea that technical and institutional environments 
exist independently, influencing actors’ behaviors at the different diffusion stages.  
However, more recently scholars contend that the two-stage diffusion model 
tends to overlook the reciprocal relationships between technical and institutional 
fields. They argue that technical environments may not be independent of institutional 
environments (Friedland and Alford 1991; Garud and Kumaraswamy 1995; 
Lounsbury 2007; Scott 2008; Thornton and Ocasio 2008). For example, Thornton 
(2004) argues that technical and market structures are the outcomes of actors’ 
cognitive and cultural framing, and thus they are indeed embedded in institutions 
along with other social structures. Her argument implies that technologies, markets 
and profit organizations form a subset of institutions.  
Further, Alford and Friedland (1985) emphasize that multiple practices and 
beliefs inherently exist in contemporary society. They assert that the bureaucratic 
state, families, democracy, capital markets and religion constitute major institutions 
in modern western society. They consider institutions to be material practices and 




environments (Friedland and Alford 1991). According to their notion of institutions, 
capital markets, known as a core of technical environments, constitute an important 
aspect of institutions in the modern western society. Even in their technology study, 
Garud and Kumaraswamy (1995, p. 227) claim that “[w]e can understand and better 
shape the evolution of technological systems by coupling their institutional and 
technical environments.” They suggest that it is important to take into consideration 
the interconnectedness between technical and institutional environments in order to 
understand the complexity of technological evolution. 
Mounting evidence also casts doubt on the schematic findings of the two-
stage diffusion model. Palmer, Barber, Zhou, and Soysal (1995) have discovered that 
economic aspects have been quite important factors influencing the widespread 
diffusion of organizational forms and business practices, even in the later diffusion 
process. Moreover, Kennedy and Fiss (2009), in their empirical research on the 
diffusion of TQM among U.S. hospitals in the early 1990s, have also found that both 
motivations to gain social legitimacy and to improve economic performance co-exist 
throughout the entire diffusion process. Furthermore, in their study of the U.S. 
electricity industry, Sine, Haveman and Tolbert (2005) have shown that institutional 
conditions systematically influence the emergence of novel technology at the early 
stage of technology adoption. Sine et al. demonstrate that institutional-level regulative 
and cognitive support for novel but as yet unproven technology encourages 
entrepreneurs to adopt the novel technology and to subsequently build new electric-
power plants using the novel technology. This evidence, taken together, challenges 




and legitimacy purposes in the later stage—implying rather that actors’ consideration 
of technical rationality may be part of institutional processes. 
The debates about the boundaries of technology and institutions expand into a 
discussion of the appropriateness of the definition of institutions. As mentioned 
earlier, institutions are generally defined as supra-organizational patterns of social 
practices which regulate actors’ behaviors (Friedland and Alford 1991; Hughes 1939). 
Institutional scholars note that these patterns of practices are socially constructed, and 
they are regulated by a set of rewards and sanctions (Jepperson 1991). Further 
elaborating the concept of institutions, Scott (1995, 2001, 2008) proposes three pillars 
of institutions: the regulatory, normative and cognitive-cultural structures.  
There is, however, a considerable debate regarding whether institutions should 
possess all three properties (see Phillips and Malhotra 2008, for a review). Phillips 
and Malhotra (2008) argue that while Scott’s three pillars are fairly comprehensive, 
the integration of three pillars as one unity of institutions may be problematic. 
Because the three pillars of institutions are derived from different theoretical 
disciplines, each aspect of institutions involves different philosophical assumptions 
about social reality and thereby asks different fundamental questions. For example, 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) primarily emphasize the cognitive and normative aspects of 
institutions. They argue that institutions “. . . inevitably involve normative obligations 
but often enter into social life primarily as facts which must be taken into account by 
[the] actor (Meyer and Rowan 1977, p. 341).” Based on this definition of institutions, 
they further define institutionalization as “. . . the processes by which social processes, 




action. . .” which again includes only cognitive and normative processes. Berger, 
Berger and Kellner (1973), on the other hand, stress social actors’ cognitive thought-
processing. They argue that social actors face different viewpoints of modernization, 
a situation which forces the social actors to isolate themselves from the meanings of 
modern institutions. North (1990) emphasizes the regulative aspect of institutions. He 
views institutions as the formal and informal “rules of the game” which enforce 
actors’ behaviors. Thus, according to North’s (1990) perspective, punishment for the 
violation of the rules is enacted to control actors’ behaviors.  
In addition to the problems regarding the disparate nature of institutions, 
Hirsch (1997) further argues that Scott’s view of institutions tends to be static, 
because it fails to adequately address how actors respond to social conflicts about 
norms and values and how institutional change can take place if a violation of 
conformity to shared norms and values is penalized by a set of rewards and sanctions.  
Notwithstanding the debate about the definition of institutions, recent 
institutional work implies that technology comprises a subset of institutions 
(Thornton and Ocasio 2008). Technology has unique characteristics of pure scientific 
knowledge—a property of actuality. At the same time, technology is socially 
constructed by scientists, engineers, policymakers, technology users and other 
relevant social groups—a property of social process. In other words, technology can 
be an institution that is made up of a set of actual production activities which have 
meanings and values for the society. Thus, it is evident that technology involves a 




Additionally, in the previous section I defined technology as human activities 
believed to maximize economic efficiency and technical rationality. Thus, to some 
extent, technology involves a normative aspect of institutions—rules guiding human 
behaviors believed to maximize economic efficiency. Consequently, recent 
institutionalists tend to consider technology to be a subset of an institution, and 
technological development to be institutionalization processes through which actors 
develop shared meanings, norms and values associated with technology.  
The primary purpose of this study is not to address this debate regarding 
whether technology is an institution. What is more important is how actors and 
institutions together shape technology development. Thus, this study explores social 
processes influencing the reciprocity among actors, institutions and technology. 
Related to the traditional structure-agency arguments, additional fundamental 
questions about the evolution of technology also include (1) whether institutions 
shape technology development, (2) whether human agents collectively determine the 
destiny of technological development, and/or (3) whether institutions shape actors’ 
cognition and behaviors in the technology context (Orlikowski 1992).  
While the relationships between institutions and social actors have long been 
discussed in the fields of organization theory and sociology, empirical findings are 
still incomplete and debated (e.g., Alexander and Giesen 1987; DiMaggio and Powell 
1991; Giddens 1979, 1984; Scott 1995; Sewell 1992). Scholars based in neo-
institutional theory generally emphasize the role of institutions in shaping social 
actors’ behaviors and cognition (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 




politically embedded agents largely confined by institutional constraints. Resulting 
empirical studies have focused on several processes: isomorphic and diffusion 
processes of adopting formal structures and practices (e.g., Fligstein 1985; Tolbert 
and Zucker 1983), societal and cultural mindsets influencing organizational founding 
(Dacin 1997), effects of actors’ collective mindsets on their homogeneous political 
behaviors (Neustadtl and Clawson 1988), and the differential effects of institutional 
logics on managerial attention (e.g., Thornton 2002; Thornton and Ocasio 1999). 
In contrast, research based on institutionalization theory and rooted in the 
social constructivist view explores the process through which actors generate new 
institutions, understand their meanings, share new meanings with other actors, and in 
turn gain legitimacy (e.g., Berger and Luckmann 1967; Elsbach 1994; Suchman 
1995). Research in this vein has identified the strategic actions by which actors 
develop new institutions and gain legitimacy (e.g., Fligstein 2001; Jarzabkowski 
2008; Rao, Monin, and Durand 2003; Suddaby and Greenwood 2005). Mounting 
empirical evidence suggests that actors may not be passive agents who conform to 
institutional constraints, but rather purposefully evaluate the benefits and costs to 
adopting institutions, given their institutional constraints (e.g., Rao, Greve, and Davis 
2001). Some scholars have found that economic crisis and new technological 
developments can become sources of institutional change (e.g., Barley 1986; Oliver 
1992; Tolbert and Zucker 1983); and that actors’ structural network positions and 
political dominance influence their ability to change institutions (Greenwood and 
Suddaby 2006; Tarrow 1998). Other scholars have discovered that in order to gain 




Suddaby and Greenwood 2005), intentionally familiarize new institutions with old 
ones (Hargadon and Douglas 2001), and often compete for stakeholders’ 
endorsements (Rao 1994). 
Recent research on institutional theory has proposed bridging the two 
perspectives (Barley and Tolbert 1997; Klein and Kleinman 2002). In order to 
incorporate the two fundamentally different views, Barley and Tolbert (1997, p. 96) 
propose a modified definition of institutions: “shared rules and typifications that 
indentify categories of social actors and their appropriate activities or relationships.” 
Given this modified definition of institutions, they specify that “institutions vary in 
their normative power and their effect on [human agents’] behavior (Barley and 
Tolbert 1997).” The variations of institutions in terms of their social standings, 
historical backgrounds and social influences allow room for actors to exert influence 
on the institutions. Institutions are no longer enduring or stable, but constantly 
constructed by the collective behaviors of social actors. In order to comprehend the 
mechanisms of institutional change, it is therefore important to understand how actors 
influence the construction of institutions—and at the same time how institutions 
shape the embedded actors’ daily activities. The institutional logic approach, to some 
extent, addresses these dynamic institutional processes. I discuss this approach in 
greater detail in the following section. 
 
1. 2. 3. Institutional Logic 
A review of the extant technology and institutional literature suggests that the 




interpretive processes that occur among actors. Through the interactive processes, 
actors understand the meanings and socio-economic value of new technology. An 
important question that then arises is this: How is technology constructed by social 
actors? In order to better understand social processes shaping the emergence of new 
technology, I revisit the concept of institutional logic developed by institutional 
scholars, and I argue that institutional logics can play a mediating role in connecting 
actors to technology. 
Institutional logics are defined as social actors’ collective cognitive and 
cultural prescriptions that guide their interpretations of institutions and behaviors. 
Alford and Friedland (1985) initially coined the term institutional logics, claiming 
that an individual institution has a unique logic that regulates behaviors and cognition 
of social actors within the institutional field. Thornton and Ocasio (1999) extend 
Friedland and Alford’s (1991) notion of institutional logics, and they augment the 
concept of institutional logics by adding the notion of social construction. They 
explicitly define institutional logics as the “socially constructed, historical patterns” 
of material practices and cognitive/cultural principles by which embedded social 
actors replicate their material substance and provide meaning to their society. This 
view suggests that institutional logics provide actors with rules, principles and 
cultural assumptions about how to interpret institutions and how to behave. 
Greenwood, Díaz, Li, and Lorente (2010) recently highlighted the temporal flexibility 
and multiplicity of institutional logics to better understand the role of institutional 




granted “resilient” social prescriptions that enable actors to make sense of their 
situation (Greenwood, Díaz, Li, and Lorente 2010, p. 1).  
The multiplicity of institutional logics within a single institutional 
environment implies that social actors can encounter events in which different 
institutional logics may collide with one another. The contestation between different 
sets of institutional logics can lead to social conflicts that require institutional logics 
to be more flexible, which is somewhat different from the neo-institutional arguments 
suggesting institutional lock-in after the legitimation process. The property of 
multiplicity suggests that institutionalization may not be a single process that 
smoothly converges on structural homogeneity in the long run. Rather 
institutionalization is a multiple and complex process through which social actors 
who are faced with competing institutional logics create social conflicts and actively 
support particular sets of logics. Even after the legitimation process, embedded social 
actors are indeed exposed to the potential conflict in logics. Locally institutionalized 
beliefs, norms and values may escalate social conflicts, because social actors with 
these localized institutional logics may not easily adopt other institutional logics.   
In addition, Thornton and Ocasio’s (1999) notion of social construction makes 
it possible to address the dynamic process of constructing or deconstructing 
institutional logics, simultaneously leading to de-institutionalization or re-
institutionalization processes (Oliver 1992). This temporal flexibility of institutional 
logics results from social actors’ collective processes of reaching a social consensus. 
Because technological evolution is a social and cultural phenomenon occurring at 




groups embedded within their own institutional logics interact with other social 
groups with different institutional logics—and how they reach a social consensus of 
meanings of technology and collectively determine technological trajectories (e.g., 
Pinch and Bijker 1984).  
 
1. 3. Theoretical Framework of Technology Development 
1. 3. 1. Technology, Institutional Logic and Actor 
As I discussed in the previous section, institutional logics provide actors with 
cognitive and material guidelines which actors use to interpret technology and embed 
it into their daily lives. Figure 1 portrays the relationships among actors, institutional 
logics and technologies. Actors are often faced with multiple institutional logics that 
are embedded within their own institutional logics. Due to the embeddedness, 
institutional logics can enable or disable actors to adopt a particular technology. As 
prevailing institutional logics arguments suggest, actors’ interpretations are largely 
constrained by institutional logics (e.g., Friedland and Alford 1991; Thornton and 
Ocasio 1999). The interpretive flexibility of actors is a critical factor that influences 
the subsequent development of new technologies or further technological innovation 
(e.g., Bijker 1987; Kaplan and Tripsas 2008). The introduction of new technology 
triggers conflict between different institutional logics. Existing social actors attempt 
to make sense of the new technology, based on their own institutional logics. 
*** Insert Figure 1 about here *** 
In sum, institutional logics provide actors with cognitive or normative tools 




technology. Technology development is thus tightly entangled with these cognitive 
and normative tools (Bijker 1987; Kaplan and Tripsas 2008).  
 
1. 3. 2. Overview of Theoretical Framework 
Competition among alternative technologies is the social process through 
which multiple and conflicting institutional logics in different institutional fields 
compete against one another. Thus, it is important to understand the reciprocity 
between technology-related fields associated with technology development. In the 
technology field, technology entrepreneurs introduce a new technology to their 
technology community, leading to technological innovation. The introduction of a 
new technology or practice spontaneously triggers discourse both within and outside 
the technology field (Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy 2004). Actors in different 
institutional fields use different institutional logics to interpret a new technology 
(Garud and Rappa 1994). In the situation where multiple logics are equally significant 
and simultaneously affect the cognition and behaviors of actors, conflict in 
institutional logics may take place (Greenwood, Díaz, Li, and Lorente 2010). The 
successful management of contested institutional logics depends on how effectively 
technology entrepreneurs mobilize different logics and build social alignment across 
the logics (Garud, Hardy, and Maguire 2007; Munir and Phillips 2005).  
On the other hand, actors in the sociocultural field can also influence 
technology development. Social movements theory in particular suggests that the 
collective actions of actors that occur in the social, political and economic spheres can 




contestation (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986). 
Actors who are dissatisfied with prevailing logics form a social group which shares 
similar beliefs, gradually developing a shared identity, and acting to change the 
current status quo (e.g., Tilly 1978). Through this process, actors collectively create a 
new institutional logic (Rao, Monin, and Durand, 2003). In particular, when social 
movements aim to solve generic social issues such as environmental protection, 
income gap, gender inequality and labor-related activity, an institutional logic 
resulting from these social movements can easily diffuse into different institutional 
fields (McAdam and Scott 2005). Through these collective processes, a new 
institutional logic that is created in the social and cultural field can influence 
technology development. 
Figure 2 depicts the interplay between technology and sociocultural fields, 
which can determine the evolution of new technology. To explore the collective 
social and cultural processes of technology development, I first distinguish between 
technological and sociocultural fields where technology inventors and users exchange 
their own institutional logics associated with new technology. A new technology 
generated by technology entrepreneurs spontaneously triggers technological discourse 
and creates unequivocal and multiple interpretations of the new technology in the 
technology field. Through a series of professional debates, technologists mobilize 
new and old logics, develop shared understandings of the technology, and then 
reinforce the newly-created logic. If other technical groups do not accept the new 
logic, it will not develop into a taken-for-granted institution, and as a result the related 




*** Insert Figure 2 about here *** 
Furthermore, a new institutional logic accepted in the technology field may 
not be able to develop into a socially and culturally shared institution until it is 
accepted in the sociocultural field. In this field technology users are critical players. 
They also create their own interpretations of a new technology. Based on their own 
logics, they evaluate the usefulness and value of the new technology in their daily 
lives. The institutional logics of technology users may consist of familiarity, utility 
and the socio-economic value of new technology. If the newly-developed logic is not 
well-aligned with the logics of technology users, again it will not be accepted as a 
taken-for-granted institution, and the related technology will not gain legitimacy. 
Institutional entrepreneurs are those who are capable of creating new social structures 
or roles, in turn shaping the logics of technology users (Garud, Hardy, and Maguire 
2007; Garud, Jain, and Kumaraswamy 2002; Fligstein 2001).  
On the other hand, actors in the sociocultural realm can influence 
technological discourse by directly introducing a new institutional logic to the 
technology community. Social movements that create abstract-level ideology or that 
target specific technologies often drive a fundamental change in the existing 
institutional logics in the technological field (Fligstein and McAdam 2011; 
O’Mahony and Bechky 2008).  
Faced with multiple and competing institutional logics, technologists may 
choose different institutionalization mechanisms, depending on the extent of the need 
for supporting a new logic in the technology and sociocultural fields. I propose four 




A new logic may replace an existing logic—replacing (e.g., Thornton 2002), 
complement it—patching (e.g., Gylnn and Lounsbury 2005), temporally be used—
sequencing (e.g., Hargadon and Douglas 2001), or resist accepting it—reinforcing 
(e.g., Oliver 1991). These four mechanisms determine four different types of 
technological development. In the following sections, I first discuss in greater detail 
the interplay between technological and sociocultural fields and then develop several 
propositions that theorize about linkages between formation of institutional logics and 
types of technology development. 
 
1. 3. 3. Linkage between Technological and Sociocultural Fields 
In the technology field, technology entrepreneurs—such as scientists, 
engineers, technical professionals and policymakers—collectively introduce new 
technologies and relevant practices, and share their meanings through a series of 
discussions. Technologists resonate with other technical groups and often modify 
their own technological frames. Subsequent development of technologies and relevant 
practices, and further elaboration of the concepts and meanings of technologies are 
largely constrained by the extent to which technology entrepreneurs with different 
knowledge repertoires are committed to their own technological “habitats” (Berger 
and Heath 2005; Bourdieu 1996; Camic 1986; Garud and Rappa 1994). This is 
because the strong commitment of technologists to their own technological frames 
often makes it difficult to understand or adopt new technological concepts (Bijker 




Bijker (1987), for example, stresses that the degree of the interpretive 
flexibility of scientists and engineers determines the success or failure of 
technological development. He argues that scientists or engineers with more flexible 
technological frames are better-equipped to recognize nuanced differences in 
knowledge and to assimilate the knowledge into their own frame. Echoing Bijker’s 
(1987) notion of interpretive flexibility, Orlikowski (1992) demonstrates that actors 
with high levels of interpretive flexibility are the ones who perceive the limitations of 
the current technology and alter its functionality. Likewise, Carlile (2002) suggests 
that it is more important to develop common artifacts, standardized methods and 
formalized practices from which engineers and scientists embedded within their own 
technological frame can successfully cooperate to create new technology. Dougherty 
(1992) similarly argues that social groups from different knowledge domains would 
face interpretive barriers, because each technological domain has its unique “thought 
world” that helps its social group understand problems and issues in its own domain, 
but at the same time prevents its social group from understanding ideas from different 
knowledge domains. She further suggests that in order to manage these interpretive 
barriers, it is crucial to build formal structures that facilitate collaboration across 
disparate knowledge domains.  
These mechanisms discussed above imply that logic construction consists of 
two primary components: representation of embedded actors’ knowledge and social 
interactions among actors. That is, logic construction includes a set of actors’ 
activities of integrating a variety of interpretations of novel technologies and relevant 




The representation of embedded actors’ knowledge is the process through 
which social actors translate their own “thought world” into different “thought 
worlds”.  Of particular importance in the knowledge representation stage is choosing 
the proper words to alert the attention of the other actors, triggering technological 
discussions and enhancing collective memory. This is because representations are 
largely constrained by the knowledge repertoires of social actors. Beger and Heath 
(2005) introduce a concept of “habitat” and argue that an idea’s success varies with 
the prevalence of its “habitat.” Ideas are culturally embedded within the “habitat” 
which provides cues for helping to retrieve previous memory. The underlying 
argument is that an idea resides in a record and that the “habitat” to which actors 
belong provides cues to help them retrieve the record that they have stored in their 
memory. Regardless of how effectively an idea is encoded, if an environment does 
not regularly cue people to retrieve the idea, it is unlikely to persist and spread within 
the culture. Likewise, Hargadon and Douglas (2001) suggest that to gain social 
acceptance in the established field, institutional entrepreneurs should develop a 
“robust design” which embodies a new idea yet at the same time effectively exploits 
existing institutions. They argue that this familiarizing process reduces resistance to 
new logics while promoting social acceptance.   
Interactions among social actors can be defined as a set of social actors’ 
activities of conveying their knowledge to other social actors. Researchers suggest 
that the standardization or formalization of cues may help develop common 
understandings of the usefulness of novel knowledge, in turn facilitating 




the creation of new structures, orders or roles that provide incentives for coordination 
activities may also promote transmission of knowledge (Dougherty 1992). Brown and 
Duguid (1991) further argue that knowledge transmission is more likely to take place 
when social actors experience actual and informal practices that are generated and 
shared within the technological community. 
Competition of institutional logics in the technology field mostly relates to 
discourse about the true meaning and value of technology. That is, primary debates in 
this field center on whether new technology can expand, given the restrictions and 
opportunities provided by existing technological and material substances; whether 
new technology can achieve techno-economic efficiency and generate desired 
outcomes, or whether socio-economic infrastructure supports new technology. If new 
technology does not satisfy the institutional logics shared by the technological 
community, it will not develop into taken-for-granted institutions, as the 
technological discussion will screen out this outcome. 
While the technology field serves as a primary source of new knowledge and 
technology (Rosenberg 1982), technology entrepreneurs should continuously interact 
with actors in the sociocultural field where the actors eventually become the end users 
of the new technology (e.g., Garud, Jain, and Kumaraswamy 2002). Actors in those 
two fields may possess different institutional logics. A new technology created in the 
technology field triggers market-related discussions in the sociocultural field where 
technology users evaluate the value and usefulness of new technology based on their 
own institutional logics. An institutional logic in the sociocultural field includes a set 




technology—and thus developing new norms, values, and beliefs revolving around 
the new technology.  
Successful interactions between technology and sociocultural fields depend on 
the ability of technology entrepreneurs to communicate with technology users in 
order to develop shared understandings (Fligstein 2001). If technology entrepreneurs 
are creators of new logics associated with technology, institutional entrepreneurs are 
storytellers who govern narrative processes in the sociocultural field (Garud, Jain, and 
Kumaraswamy 2002; Lounsbury and Glynn 2001; Zilber 2007). The introduction of a 
new technology, by nature, produces numerous conflicts of interest among social 
actors who operate in the related technical and institutional environments (Biggart 
and Beamish 2003; Sewell 1992). A new technology often conveys a counter-story to 
existing technology. When it comes with ethical and normative issues, the harshness 
of language and emotional engagement can easily escalate (Zilber 2007). In order to 
become successful institutional entrepreneurs, technology entrepreneurs need to know 
how to cultivate social, political and institutional legitimacy at the broader 
institutional level. This can be done by managing the social and cultural resistance to 
adopting new technologies and practices (Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Fligstein 2001).  
The traditional technological innovation model tends to neglect this social 
embeddedness of innovation processes through which a new technology gets widely 
accepted by other social actors and becomes a dominant design (Granovetter and 
McGuire 1998). Institutional entrepreneurs often act to shape the institutional logics 
of social actors or to modify a new technology to align it with the institutional logics 




entrepreneurs often create new social roles and structures in order to embed new 
technology into actors’ everyday lives (Munir and Phillips 2005). For example, Munir 
and Phillips (2005) show how Kodak has managed to popularize photographic 
technology and has embedded this technology into institutionalized practices. As a 
result of its effort to communicate with technology users, Kodak can successfully 
transform photography from a specialized hobby of a limited social class to a central 
part of the daily lives of social actors, and can eventually create a new social role (i.e., 
creating a new role of housewives—creating family histories through photographs in 
the early 1900s). 
More importantly, prevailing technology work has still revolved around how 
technology entrepreneurs can shape social structure and social order. How actors in 
the sociocultural field can act to shape technology development is relatively 
understudied. A few studies within the technology history literature have discussed 
the importance of the role of technology users in shaping technology evolution. For 
example, in the study of the early U.S. automobile industry, Kline and Pinch (1996) 
discuss how several different transportation technologies—such as gasoline- and 
steam-powered cars and electric cars in the U.S. automobile industry—evolved out of 
the technological, economic, social and cultural races of the early 1880s. Berger’s 
(1979) study well illustrates how technology users determined the success of the 
internal combustion engine cars in the early 1880s. Despite the technological 
superiority of the internal combustion engine vehicles to horses, social actors, 
especially rural dwellers and state legislatures, initially opposed the dirty, noisy and 




incompatibility of horses and motorized cars on the road strengthened the anti-car 
movements (Berger 1979; Kline and Pinch 1996). “Red devil” and “devil wagon” 
were terms that represented technology users’ antagonism and soon symbolized the 
negativity toward the new technology of motorized cars (Kline and Pinch 1996).  
However, in the early 1900s, possession of automobiles gradually expanded 
the lifestyles of rural dwellers’ in more efficient ways. Socialization, leisure, church, 
health and education all became more accessible to the rural community due to 
motorized cars. This social process eventually allowed the internal combustion engine 
cars to completely replace old means of transportation (Berger 1979). In particular, 
compared to the potential of steam engine and electric cars, the long distance drive, 
power and speed of internal combustion engine cars has fascinated travelers and 
technical amateurs (Mom 2004; Sachs 1984). Ever since the First World War, internal 
combustion engine cars have dominated the automotive technology industry (Kirsch 
2000).  
Social movement scholars emphasize the roles of collective social and 
political processes in mobilizing people and resources to construct and reconstruct 
social goals, ideologies and cultural frames (for a review, see McAdam and Scott 
2005). They argue that social movements serve as a new momentum that triggers the 
destruction of existing institutional logics and fosters the creation of a new 
institutional logic (Rao, Monin, and Durand 2003; Scott, Ruef, Mendel, and Caronna, 
2000). Social movements stemming from a specialized social sphere can be easily 




social spheres (McAdam and Scott 2005). Certain issues of social movements thus 
often become a source of nationwide or worldwide debates.  
In the technology context, social movements can serve as a source of the 
emergence of a new technology, by influencing social actors’ choice of technologies. 
The emergence of new electric and hybrid vehicles illustrates well how generic social 
movements can influence the technology field. In the 1960s, environmental 
movements in the sociocultural field facilitated the resurgence of alternative fuel 
vehicles, such as electric cars (Anderson and Anderson 2010). They initially began by 
calling for protecting the environment from pollution and later influenced the 
development of environmentally-friendly technology (Pepper 1996). A wave of 
environmental movements in the 1960s facilitated the creation of grassroots 
environmental organizations and government organizations. As part of these efforts, 
in 1970 the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency was formed to facilitate the 
regulatory support for environmental protection. One of its goals was to support the 
research and development of alternative fuel vehicles. Other environmental 
organizations continued to exert social and political pressure on the industrial sector, 
by lobbying for raising environmental standards. Moreover, in the mid-1970s, the oil 
crisis increased social actors’ awareness of natural resources, which fostered a 
skepticism about gasoline as a permanent energy source. These social movements 
strengthened an environmental logic, which has long generated new controversies and 
debates among environmental activists and industry associations since the 1960s 
(Sachs 1999). Scientists and engineers in the community of electric vehicle 




value of electric cars. The technologists’ adoption of an environmental logic escalated 
conflict in logics in the technology field; and their adoption of an environmental logic 
facilitated the resurgence of electric vehicles beginning in the late 1960s. I therefore 
offer the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1. Collective actions in the sociocultural field will influence the 
development of new technologies. 
 
 
1. 3. 4. Logic Formation and Types of Technology Development 
Differences in institutional logics in technological and sociocultural fields 
generate controversies, thereby intensifying social conflict. As mentioned earlier, new 
technologies or institutional logics debated in the technology field provide sources or 
topics for market-level debates during which technology users express their opinions 
and feelings about new technology (e.g., Abrahamson and Fairchild 1999). 
Conversely, institutional logics of technology users can also facilitate or hinder the 
further development of new technology (Dowell, Swaminathan, and Wade 2002). 
New institutional logics, having met criteria in the technology field, may not develop 
into cognitively- and culturally-shared institutions unless they are accepted in the 
sociocultural field.  
A critical question that needs to be addressed is how technologists respond to 
multiple and often conflicting institutional logics, and how variations in 
technologists’ responses influence different types of technology development. The 
institutional entrepreneurship literature suggests that entrepreneurs with the ability to 




new logics into socially- and culturally-accepted logics (e.g., Biggart and Beamish 
2003; Fligstein 1997; 2001). Such entrepreneurial activities provide legitimacy for 
new technology; and the attainment of legitimacy increases the survival rate of new 
technology (Aldrich and Fiol 1994).  
Different responses of institutional entrepreneurs may drive different types of 
technology development. Considering the strength of technologists’ and social actors’ 
support for a new institutional logic, I propose four distinctive institutionalization 
mechanisms and their influences on technology development. 
*** Insert Figure 3 about here *** 
The first institutionalization mechanism of institutional logics is replacing. 
This mechanism describes how a newly-created or newly-adopted logic completely 
replaces an existing logic. Thornton’s (2002) study on the higher education 
publishing industry demonstrates that publishing firms faced with environmental 
changes have gradually transformed existing editorial logics, focusing on editors’ 
social relations to market logics, and placing more emphasis on business models over 
the course of the past thirty years. This is because new publishing markets have 
forced publishing companies to focus more on economic outcomes. The results show 
that broader economic conditions have created a new market logic and that actors 
have strategically replaced the old editorial logic with the new market logic to 
conform to changes in the sociocultural field.  
Similarly, the replacing mechanism can take place in the technology context. 
The example of the emergence and decline of the internal combustion engine and 




logic. Prior to the invention of the internal combustion engine, an agricultural logic 
had dominated the pre-industrial society and had been closely attached to actors’ 
everyday lives. However, the advent of the internal combustion engine ushered in a 
new era of the industrial society. Actors in the social and cultural field believed that 
economic growth provided economic wealth and job opportunities (Hays 1995). 
Primary concerns of technologists in the technology field were also related to techno-
economic efficiency, infrastructure and markets, all of which made up an industrial 
logic.  
This industrial logic further strengthened the dominance of the internal 
combustion engine (Hays 1995; Mom 2004). Actors viewed that internal combustion 
engine vehicles functionally outperformed horse-drawn vehicles and met 
contemporary social needs. Furthermore, infrastructure (i.e., gas stations, oil refinery 
facilities, etc.) had been built and were ready to support the use of internal 
combustion engine cars (Mom and Kirsch 2001). The creation of new collective 
beliefs—industrial logic—resulted in deinstitutionalization of old beliefs—
agricultural logic. Shifting the agricultural logic to the industrial logic in both 
technology and sociocultural fields fostered the transition from the horse-and-buggy 
age to the horseless age. I therefore propose the following: 
 
Proposition 2a. When a new logic is strongly supported by both technological and 
sociocultural groups, technologists will replace the existing logic with a new logic. 
 
 
Proposition 2b. The replacement of an existing logic by a new logic will lead to 






Another institutionalization mechanism is patching. In some case, a new 
institutional logic may not be able to completely replace an old one. When an existing 
logic is closely and extensively connected to the cultural and social lives of actors, it 
is not easy for actors to completely replace an old logic with a new logic. This is 
because the replacing mechanism incurs fairly large social and economic costs, takes 
a fairly long time to engage in sense-making processes and generates extensive 
conflicts of interests among different social groups with different institutional logics 
(Garud and Karnøe 2001). Thus, if actors in the sociocultural field do not strongly 
support a new logic while technologists strongly do support the new logic, then the 
mere addition or modification of a prevailing logic can occur in the technology field. 
In particular, if both old and new logics are equally significant, technologists may act 
to combine the two logics to minimize social conflicts (c.f. Oliver 1991). 
Furthermore, if the new and old logics are complementary, a combination of the two 
logics may decrease social conflict but increase the level of social acceptance. This 
patching mechanism would subsequently lead to hybridization of new and old 
technologies. 
For example, in their study of critics’ reviews of Atlanta Symphony Orchestra 
performances, Glynn and Lounsbury (2005) demonstrate that because an authenticity 
logic has long served as a cultural frame for assessing the performance of the Atlanta 
Symphony Orchestra, the judgments of critics have still used the authenticity logic 
although there has been an external shock favoring a commercially-oriented market 
logic. As a result, instead of discarding the authenticity logic, critics have often 




Likewise, in the technology context, Hargadon and Douglas (2001) show how 
purposefully Edison customizes electric lighting (new technology) without 
dramatically changing preexisting schemas and scripts for gas lighting (old 
technology). They demonstrate that by imitating the features of gas lighting, Edison 
has shaped the existing mindsets or beliefs of customers, regulators and even 
investors, and has helped them to easily understand the meanings, usefulness and 
purposes of new electric lighting systems. When existing technology has been long 
embedded within the sociocultural field and has been shaping social structure and 
order, technologists may attempt to explore the way in which they incorporate some 
elements of a new logic into an existing logic (Fligstein 2001). Edison’s patching 
effort results in hybridization of old and new technologies. 
In addition, Kaplan and Murray (2010) also show how technologists modify a 
prevailing economic logic which has long influenced the biotechnology industry over 
the course of thirty years. In the 1970s, biotechnology firms focused on building a 
standard business model by which firms could successfully commercialize 
biotechnologies. The initial focus was on setting a right business model. Unlike 
biotech firms, courts, government agencies, scientists and markets placed different 
values on the commercialization of biotechnologies. A wide range of actors 
associated with the biotechnology industry mobilized testing evidence, providing new 
interpretations of evidence. To accommodate the needs from different institutional 
fields, firms had begun to add new issues such as safety, intellectual property and 
economic development to the initial economic logic. Throughout this process, actors 




evidence and played an important role in modifying an initial economic logic. 
Furthermore, this patching mechanism of institutional logics led to a series of 
multidisciplinary research studies which take into account all concerns of multiple 
actors associated with the biotechnology community. I therefore offer the following 
propositions: 
 
Proposition 3a. When a new logic is strongly supported by technological groups but 








The third mechanism is sequencing. When institutional entrepreneurs believe 
that a new logic may not be able to win the battle of institutional logics, they can 
develop a temporary logic to popularize the new logic (e.g., Munir and Phillips 2005). 
In the early history of the U.S. automotive industry, the upper social class did not 
accept gasoline-based internal combustion engine cars as a means of transportation, 
because motorized cars were perceived as a dirty, noisy, dangerous and unreliable 
means of transportation, compared to horses, the traditional means (Berger 1979). In 
contrast, electric cars were elegant, quiet and technologically advanced, compared to 
the internal combustion engine cars (Kirsch 1996). In the early motor age, electric 
vehicles played an important role in popularizing motorized cars and destroying 
emotional and cultural resistance to using motorized cars. Gradually, the gasoline-
based internal combustion vehicles soon surpassed social actors’ cultural expectations 




faster, more efficient, more powerful and more reliable gasoline-based internal 
combustion cars, which led to dominance of gasoline-based internal combustion 
engine vehicles. That is, electric vehicles played the role of “Trojan Horse” over the 
course of the transition from the horse age to the horseless age (Mom 2004).  
The emergence of hybrid vehicles is another example of technological 
development that results from the sequencing mechanism of institutional logics. After 
intense technology competition among gasoline-powered, steam-powered and 
electricity-powered cars during the period of 1880-1920, internal combustion engine 
vehicles dominated the motor industries (Kirsch 2000; Mom 2004). However, a small 
group of scientists and engineers continued to develop electric vehicles to prepare for 
“the second battle” (Kirsch 2000). In particular, the aesthetic features of electric 
vehicles such as simplicity, technical elegance, cleanliness and minimal noise drew 
attention to scientists and engineers (Kirsch 2000). Later, environmental groups 
joined in the promotion of electric vehicles as an alternative to internal combustion 
engine vehicles. Air pollution, global warming, the growing scarcity of natural 
resources, and corporate social responsibility demanded alternative vehicles, which 
stimulated legislative efforts and social movements. Finally in 1967 the Electric Auto 
Association (EAA), a local electric car organization was formed by Walter Laski in 
San Jose, California to promote technological advancement and the widespread 
adoption of electric vehicles. Relatedly, in 1969 a group of scientists and engineers 
who had passionate interests and optimistic beliefs about the future of electric cars 




international research conference among the community of electric automotive 
technology researchers.  
Despite the wave of environmental movements in the 1960s, this was not an 
easy battle for a small number of social and technical groups, because gasoline-based 
internal combustion engine cars had long been dominating the worldwide automobile 
markets. When assessing the future of electric vehicles, even scientists and engineers 
largely relied on techno-economic criteria such as economic benefits and costs of 
electric cars, techno-economic efficiency and viability of infrastructure, all of which 
represent an institutional logic used to bolster gasoline-based internal combustion 
cars—in other words, an industrial logic.  
Moreover, while environmental activists strongly supported alternative fuel 
vehicles, including electric vehicles, some social actors in the sociocultural field were 
skeptical about the commercial value of electric vehicles. They believed that in terms 
of technical instrumentality, the internal combustion engine cars outperform, that they 
are economically efficiency, and have technological superiority (i.e., power, mileage 
and speed) and benefit from well-established infrastructure (i.e., gas stations). This 
situation implies that once a certain institutional logic is taken-for- granted within the 
institutional field, the legitimate logic strongly influences actors’ behaviors and 
cognitive/cultural frames (e.g., Glynn and Lounsbury 2005; Lounsbury 2007).  
In the 1960s, when scientists and technical policymakers considered hybrid 
vehicles1 as a viable alternative to internal combustion engine cars, they believed that 
pure electric vehicles would replace a substantial number of internal combustion 
engine vehicles by the early 2000s (Hoffman 1967; Wouk 1971). The emergence of 
                                                 




hybrid vehicles exemplifies an evolutionary development of automotive technology. I 
therefore offer the following propositions:  
 
Proposition 4a. When a new logic is strongly supported by social groups but is 
weakly supported by technological groups, technologists will first use the existing 
logic but will gradually adopt a new logic. 
 
 




A final mechanism of incorporating institutional logics is reinforcing. It is 
possible that actors in both technology and sociocultural fields resist adopting a new 
logic. Rather than passively adopting a new logic or modifying their existing logic, 
actors often purposefully engage in political, social and economic negotiations in 
order to shape other actors’ frames and reinforce their own logic. Once a certain 
institutional logic is taken for granted, it tends to be “locked-in” within the 
institutional environment, which hinders subsequent institutional change (North 
1990). 
In addition to actors, other institutions such as regulations, technical standards 
and media help to stabilize the contestation among multiple institutional logics (c.f., 
Könnölä, Unruh, and Carrillo-Hermosilla 2006; Unruh 2002). In the technology 
context, Könnölä, Unruh and Carrillo-Hermosilla (2006, p. 240) view this 
phenomenon as techno-institutional lock-in, “a persistent state that creates systemic 
market and policy barriers to technological alternatives.”  
Regulations and technical standards that are favorable to existing logics and 




literature on industry standards demonstrates that the achievement of industry 
standards helps firms to maintain increasing returns resulting from economies of scale 
or precluding further entry (e.g., Arthur 1989; 1994; David 1985). In a case study of 
the success of Ethernet, Von Burg (2001) describes the process through which Robert 
Metcalf, former CEO of Ethernet, was able to manage partnerships with other firms 
and form the Ethernet community which helped create the LAN standard.  
In addition, the media also play a critical role in spreading existing norms, 
beliefs, values, practices and technology over the broader range of audience (Lampel 
2001). Media often create a dramatic story about a certain technology which enhances 
its market position. Once institutional logics become taken for granted and 
technology becomes a dominant design, such “techno-institutional lock-in” often 
hinders the further development of new technology. I therefore offer the following 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 5a. When a new logic is weakly supported by both social and technology 
groups, technologists will persistently use the existing logic. 
 
 




1. 4. Discussion 
In this chapter I provide a theoretical model that accounts for how actors can 
collectively shape future technology development via the formation of institutional 
logics. I particularly seek to theorize about linkages between actors’ formation of 




theoretical and practical implications. First, this study helps to better understand the 
process of institutional change. A fundamental question that has been long debated is 
this: How can embedded actors whose activities tend to be constrained by wider 
institutional forces implement institutional change? One line of studies on 
institutional change has argued and empirically demonstrated that external shocks and 
internal performance crises can serve as sources of institutional change (e.g., Barley 
and Tolbert 1997; Oliver 1992; Tolbert and Zucker 1983). Another line of studies 
focusing more on micro-dynamics has contended how embedded actors manage 
institutional contradictions and misaligned interests of actors during the institutional 
change (e.g., Seo and Creed 2002). Less is however known regarding how differently 
embedded actors respond to competing institutional logics, manage conflict of 
institutional logics and in turn drive institutional change.  
In this chapter I therefore have sought to address this theoretical gap, 
suggesting that actors collectively shape the formation of institutional logics. In 
addition to the endogeneity of institutional logics, the model proposed in this chapter 
also implies that institutional logics can be enablers and disablers of institutional 
change. This situation suggests that different formation of institutional logics can 
drive different types of institutional change. A new institutional logic can drive 
institutional change when social groups support the new logic, whereas an existing 
logic can hinder institutional change when social groups reinforce the existing logic. 
In the context of technological evolution, technologists encounter multiple 
institutional logics associated with technologies. A certain institutional logic would 




adoption of other technologies associated with different institutional logics. 
Successful management of competing logics depends on how effectively actors 
convince other actors who possess different institutional logics. 
Second, this study contributes to a longstanding debate regarding whether 
technology determines social structure and order or whether social forces shape the 
development of new technology. While technology determinism supports the former, 
some scholars argue the latter, suggesting that human agents can actively disrupt 
meaning systems, values, and norms within the current institutional boundaries (e.g., 
Barley and Tolbert 1997; Purdy and Gray 2009). While current agency-based studies 
on technology have contributed to the development of a structuration model of 
technology, most studies still tend to treat technology as a given and then explore 
social processes of how social actors generate different meanings of new technology, 
and subsequently develop differential social structures and roles as a result (e.g., 
Barley 1987; Orlikowski 1992).  
Less is known regarding collective mechanisms influencing development of 
new technology. The social mechanisms of incorporating different institutional logics 
can help us to understand the reciprocity between actors and institutions in the 
context of technological evolution. In particular, I show how institutional logics 
mediate between actors and technologies. Institutional logics are manifestations of 
social actors’ interpretations of technology. They are social and cultural outcomes of 
interpreting new technology, but at the same time constrain actors’ interpretations of 
other technologies. Logic formation includes the following processes: actors 




community; established institutional logics guide social actors’ cognitive thought-
processing; and different interpretations of institutional logics create social conflicts 
and lead to the creation of another formation of institutional logics. 
Third, this study contributes to the current technology literature by exploring 
endogenous social and cultural processes of technological evolution that are relatively 
overlooked in the current technology studies. Early research on the history of 
economic development has long argued that universities, scientific laboratories, and 
industries’ research and development are sources of new knowledge; and this early 
research has found that it is necessary to explore the endogenous process of 
technological development (e.g., Rosenberg 1982; 2000). However, we know 
relatively little about the origin, development, and consequence of scientific 
knowledge (Kuhn 1970). Particularly, less is known about social processes through 
which social actors collectively interpret new technology or knowledge, and how 
institutions or collective mindsets of actors restrict actors’ interpretations of new 
technology. In this chapter I propose four distinctive social mechanisms for framing 
institutional logics, and I link them to the types of technology development. This 
approach helps to better understand the social aspects of technology development 
and, to some extent, addresses why a certain technology, despite its technological 
superiority, does not become a dominant design and soon disappears in the society. 
Fourth, identification of four differential mechanisms of the evolution of 
institutional logics provides strategic implications for entrepreneurs. This helps 
entrepreneurs develop appropriate strategies when they introduce new technology. To 




appropriate strategies for communicating with relevant social actors (Fligstein 2001; 
Hallen and Eisenhardt 2011; Hargadon and Douglas 2001). When introducing new 
technology or entering new markets, entrepreneurs may have to choose strategies of 
delivering relevant logics associated with new technology, products and services, or 
often shaping existing logics. Conflict in institutional logics can take place across 
different institutional fields. Thus alignment of institutional logics across all groups of 
relevant social actors, such as scientists, engineers, industry professionals, 
policymakers and technology users, is crucial for successfully launching a new 
technology. Four mechanisms discussed in this chapter can serve as basic guidelines 
for entrepreneurs’ entry strategies.  
Finally, the linkages between institutional logics and types of technology 
development highlight the importance of entrepreneurial activities associated with 
framing institutional logics. The model suggests that the formation of institutional 
logics is an underlying mechanism shaping technology development. Thus, an 
important question for entrepreneurs or managers may be how they should design 
their technology in order to acquire support from technologists and technology users. 
In this chapter I suggest that technology development is an outcome of 
collective social processes among actors. Based on this assumption, I have sought to 
theorize about the relationships among actors, institutional logics and technology 
development. In this model I argue that actors play an integral role in technology 





Chapter 2: Social Movements, Institutional Logics and the 
Emergence of Electric and Hybrid Drive in the Electric 
Automotive Community from 1969-2009 
 
Building upon the theoretical model discussed in Chapter 1, I empirically 
examine the casual linkages among socio-economic conditions, institutional logics 
and technology development in the context of the evolution of electric and hybrid 
drives. Combining the perspectives of institutional logics and social movements, I 
argue that an institutional logic is a product of the collective social processes of actors 
and that established logics play a central role in shaping the differential development 
of new technology. To test my arguments, I explore variations in the incorporation of 
institutional logics by actors, depending on broader social and economic conditions 
and the effects of the actors’ incorporation of institutional logics on the evolution of 
electric and hybrid drive in the electric automotive community from 1969-2009.  
Empirical findings suggest that environmental protests and economic 
recessions systematically influence an actor’s incorporation of logics—environmental 
logic versus industrial logic; and that social cohesion among actors in each 
institutional logic field tends to substantially influence the emergence and decline of 
electric and hybrid drive. This study contributes to both technology and institutional 
literature by exploring how social and economic conditions relate to the ebb and flow 
of institutional logics and how institutional logics can shape technology development. 
Moreover, this study addresses a gap in the literature between institutional and social 
movement arguments, which together help us to better understand the complexity of 





2. 1. Introduction 
Since Alford and Friedland (1985) coined the term institutional logics, 
scholars have been increasingly interested in the role of institutional logics. The 
linkage between institutional logics and organizational forms or practices has been 
widely studied (Marquis and Lounsbury 2007; Lounsbury 2007; Thornton 2002). 
Departing from the unitary isomorphism arguments, much research on institutional 
logics has centered on multiplicity and conflict in institutional logics (Jones and 
Livne-Tarandach 2008; Lounsbury 2007). It is now well-documented that multiple 
institutional logics result in differential development of beliefs, practices and 
organizational forms (Greenwood, Díaz, Li, and Lorente 2010; Lounsbury 2007; Rao, 
Monin, and Durand 2003). 
While research on institutional logics has shown how actors respond to 
multiple and conflicting logics, we know less about the origin of institutional logics 
and the social and institutional forces responsible for changing or replacing existing 
institutional logics. Moreover, empirical research on institutional logics assumes that 
institutional logics are relatively stable and exogenously given. Consequently, 
operationalization of institutional logics tends to consist of relatively arbitrary 
identification and periodization, thereby limiting opportunities to study the ebb and 
flow of institutional logics.  
More importantly, little research has examined the effect of the strength of 
institutional logics on actors’ cognitive and behavioral patterns. If multiple 




strong beliefs of actors make any difference in terms of their responses to multiple 
logics? These questions, although fundamental, still remain unanswered. 
More recent research on social movements provides theoretical insights into 
how institutional logics can change, and how competing logics can destabilize the 
institutional field (Hoffman 1999; Rao, Monin, and Durand 2003). Social movement 
scholars suggest that actors collectively and purposefully create a unique group 
identity and social roles, secure necessary resources, reframe existing logics, and 
ultimately challenge current social structure and institutions (e.g., Benford and Snow 
2000; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Rao, Monin, and Durand 2003; Tilly 1978). Building 
upon this theoretical insight, much empirical work on social movements has centered 
on changes in public policies and programs, practices, and organizational form (Davis 
and Thompson 1994; Greenwood, Hinings, and Suddaby 2002; Lounsbury, 
Ventresca, and Hirsch 2003; Schneiberg, King, and Smith 2008). However, little is 
known regarding the linkage between social movements and technology development 
(see Sine and Lee 2009 for an exception). 
In this study I therefore investigate the linkages among social movements, 
institutional logics, and technology development. That is, I seek to address how social 
movements outside the boundary of a given technological community shape 
technologists’ incorporation of competing institutional logics within the technological 
community, and how the degree of technologists’ beliefs about their institutional 
logics can influence technology construction. To do this, I examine the effects of 
environmental movements and economic conditions on technologists’ incorporation 




technology construction in the international community of electric and hybrid vehicle 
researchers from 1969-2009. Empirical findings show that social movements and 
economic conditions are closely related to the ebb and flow of environmental and 
industrial logics, and that social cohesion within the two logics shapes differential 
development of electric and hybrid drive. 
In this study I focus on the endogenous social and institutional processes 
associated with new technology development. In particular, I bridge the gap between 
social movements and institutional arguments by theorizing and empirically testing 
how social movements can play an integral role in logic incorporation. Moreover, I 
assume that institutional logics are neither stable nor enduring. With this assumption, 
I empirically demonstrate how institutional logics can gain or lose their legitimacy 
and power, depending on prevailing social and economic conditions. Furthermore, to 
my knowledge, this is the first study which measures and tests the effect of the 
strength of institutional logics on technology development. Finally, I extend our 
understanding of technology development into the social and institutional spheres by 
examining how contestation in institutional logics determines differential trajectories 
of technology development. 
 
 
2. 2. Theory and Hypotheses 
Institutional logics have become increasingly important for recent institutional 
studies. Institutional logics are “the socially constructed, historical patterns of 
material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals 




provide meaning to their social reality” (Thornton and Ocasio 1999, p. 804). Because 
institutional logics are considered to be supra-organizational patterns that constitute 
shared principles (Friedland and Alford 1991), they provide cognitive and behavioral 
guidelines for actors embedded within the institution. Following this insight, scholars 
have shown that institutional logics shape actors’ strategic actions. Examples include: 
attention strategies (Thornton and Ocasio 1999), contractual practices with clients 
(Lounsbury 2007), investment decisions (Hallen 2008), and downsizing behaviors 
(Greenwood, Díaz, Li, and Lorente 2010). Although these studies have revealed the 
pluralistic attributes of institutional logics and have sought to go beyond unitary 
isomorphism arguments (see Kraatz and Block 2008 for a review), their empirical 
findings still revolve around the behavioral outcomes of multiple institutional logics. 
What remains unanswered is how a new logic is created and how current logics, more 
precisely, actors embedded within existing logics, respond to a new logic. 
Social movement arguments tend to provide theoretical insights into the 
dynamics of changes in institutional logics (see McAdam and Scott 2005 for a 
review). A social movement is “a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which 
represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or 
reward distribution of a society” (McCarthy and Zald 1977, pp. 1217-1218). Social 
movement theorists tend to suggest that institutional logics are neither stable nor 
enduring (Benford and Snow 2000). They argue that actors’ discontent, conscience, 
or morality is a source of changing current beliefs, norms and practices (McCarthy 
and Zald 1977; Tilly 1978). Collective actions facilitate demobilization, and 




Snow 2000; Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986; Weber, Heinze, and 
DeSoucey 2008). For example, Rao, Monin, and Durand (2003) showed that French 
nouvelle cuisine movement activists created a new professional logic associated with 
cuisine, and that the new logic redefines the roles of chefs and induces new social 
identity for this group.   
This social movement theory suggests that actors’ collective actions can be 
one of the major forces for creating a new institutional logic or remobilizing the 
existing logics. The question that then arises is how contestation in multiple 
institutional logics is related to technology development. I discuss this in greater 
detail in the following sections. 
 
2. 2. 1. Interplay between Social and Technological Fields 
Social movement scholars assert that social movements which originally grew 
out of a certain social group’s special interests can be generalized as supra-group 
ideology (McAdam and Scott 2005). Benford and Snow (2000) argue that actors’ 
collective frames are not merely limited to a certain social movement organization or 
its special interests. Some frames incorporate generic social problems, and thus they 
function as a master frame which influences social actors in different institutional 
arenas (e.g., Clemens 1993; Neustadtl and Clawson 1988; Schneiberg and Soule 
2005). For example, in their study of the effect of consumer boycotts on a firm’s 
stock price, King and Soule (2007) showed that social movements associated with 
consumers’ discontent with products can affect investors’ valuation of stock price in 




This “transgressive” nature of social movements hints that collective actions 
outside the boundaries of the technological field can also influence technology 
development. In considering the creation, development and diffusion of technology, 
technological and sociocultural fields are indeed not separate (Garud and 
Kumaraswamy 1995; Thornton and Ocasio 2008). For example, in their study of the 
emergence of Kodak camera technology, Munir and Phillips (2005) demonstrate how 
closely technologies, social roles and practices are linked together. They found that 
Kodak’s strategy of embedding its camera technology in actors’ everyday lives 
played a central role in its technological success.  
The history of automotive technology also vividly illustrates how actors in the 
social and cultural field collectively impact the emergence of hybrid drive (which is 
designed to use both an internal combustion engine and an electric motor to operate 
the vehicle). Actors have long believed that mass production systems, development of 
infrastructure, technological innovation and efficient use of natural resources will 
allow for economic growth, which ultimately provides the community with jobs and 
entrepreneurial opportunities, and in turn brings economic wealth (e.g., Chenery, 
Robinson, and Syrquin 1986; Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1989). These beliefs 
constitute an industrial logic in the U.S. that dates back to the early 1900s (Hays 
1995). As a countermove against this industrial logic, environmental activists and 
conservationists have advocated the preservation of the environment, claiming that 
industrialism has destroyed national environments and threatened human lives (e.g., 
Pepper 1996). Starting from local protests against polluters, environmental 




formation of grassroots environmental movement organizations as well as the 
expansion of long-standing social movement organizations such as the Sierra Club, 
the Wilderness Society, and the National Audubon Society (Gottlieb 2005; Rothman 
1998). During this period, environmental beliefs were bundled with other social 
issues such as race, gender, war, culture and political faith and became part of 
American liberalism (Isserman and Kazin 2004). A group of actors believed that 
protection of the environment from economic development provides better 
opportunities for both humans and non-humans to prosper together. These beliefs 
constitute an environmental logic. Table 1 summarizes these two logics. 
*** Insert Table 1 about here *** 
A series of environmental actions in the 1960s resulted in a string of legal and 
political successes. The first Earth Day was held on April 22, 1970, inspiring 
environmental awareness and spurring nation-wide environmental protests. On 
December 2, 1970, environmental movements helped establish the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which monitors environmental pollution, 
sets environmental standards and influences policy on environmental issues. In 1970, 
the EPA influenced the extensive amendment of the Clean Air Act that was originally 
passed by the U.S. Congress in 1963. The amended Clean Air Act covered 
requirements for control of motor vehicle emissions, including regional requirements. 
The EPA continued to play an active role in further amendments of the Clean Air Act 
in 1977 and 1990. 
In 1969, at the peak of unrest in American society, a group of electric 




(EVS) where they exchanged technical information associated with electric vehicles 
and developed global networks. Environmental movements motivated academic, 
government and industry professionals to reconsider electric vehicles as an alternative 
to the internal combustion engine vehicles. Technical professionals incorporating an 
environmental logic discussed pollution, air environments, human value and social 
pathology in this symposium.  
The above illustration demonstrates that societal-level norms, values and 
ideology are closely related to technology community. Social movement theory 
suggests that collective actions intended to change the undesirable status quo at a 
certain institutional field often impact norms and values in other institutional fields 
(see McAdam and Scott 2005 for a review). Likewise, environmental movements 
have influenced the development of new automotive technology. Actors in the 
sociocultural field are indeed potential end-users of technology, and thus their values, 
beliefs and norms often shape institutional logics in the technological field (e.g., Sine, 
Haveman, and Tolbert 2005). Moreover, although actors within the technological 
field can create a new logic through technological innovation, other actors in the 
sociocultural field can occasionally inject a new logic to the technological field 
through the formation of social movements (Sine and Lee 2009). Therefore I propose 
the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1a: Environmental protests in the sociocultural field will increase the 






Hypothesis 1b: Environmental protests in the sociocultural field will decrease the 
likelihood of an actor’s incorporation of an industrial logic in the technological field. 
 
Social movements associated with regulatory efforts and protests against 
pollution required business sectors to make significant investments into the reduction 
of pollution and limited their exploitation of resources. Significant investments to 
meet environmental standards crowded out firms that were not cost-efficient. A series 
of economic recessions in the mid-1970s, the early 1980s, the early 1990s, and the 
early and late 2000s brought about high unemployment rates, business failures and a 
slump in the manufacturing and service sectors. Economic recessions weakened 
environmental movements and allowed for more input from economic sectors. Labor 
unions joined the industry associations to protest against draconian environmental 
standards, which put cost pressure on business sectors, thereby resulting in massive 
layoffs. Those social groups pressured governments to lower environmental 
standards. Furthermore, labor unions and workers—particularly in the steel, oil, 
mining and automobile industries—often attributed huge layoffs to environmentalists’ 
idealism. Figure 1 illustrates the enduring tension between environmental and 
industrial logic. It shows that the number of environmental protests dramatically 
decreases when the unemployment rate increases. 
*** Insert Figure 4 about here*** 
This countermove also strongly influenced a series of discussions within the 
technological community. While one of the main goals of the international EVS was 
to reduce air and noise pollution resulting from internal combustion engines, an 




actors within the technological field paid attention to economic efficiency (primarily 
cost reduction), competitive price, marketing, standardization, commercialization and 
infrastructure, all of which represented an industrial logic. An industrial logic became 
a more convincing voice among arguments, particularly during the economic 
recessions. I therefore offer the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: Economic recessions in the sociocultural field will decrease the 
likelihood of an actor’s incorporation of an environmental logic in the technological 
field. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Economic recessions in the sociocultural field will increase the 
likelihood of an actor’s incorporation of an industrial logic in the technological field. 
 
 
2. 2. 2. Institutional Logics and Technology Development 
As I mentioned earlier, the existing literature on institutional logics has shown 
that institutional logics provide cognitive and behavioral guidelines which shape the 
patterns of social actors’ activity (Friedland and Alford 1991; Thornton and Ocasio 
1999). More recent institutional research investigates the role of institutional 
activities of actors in creating institutional change (c.f., Zietsma and Lawrence 2010). 
Scholars apply the concept of institutional pluralism which considers the situation 
where actors tend to face multiple, and often conflicting institutional logics within 
their institutional field (e.g., Kraatz and Block 2008; Marquis and Lounsbury 2007). 
Empirical research has demonstrated several factors: that multiple and competing 
institutional logics can coexist in different regions (Lounsbury 2007), that a new logic 




can incorporate a new logic (Glynn and Lounsbury 2005), and/or that multiple logics 
can differentially influence actors’ behaviors (Greenwood, Díaz, Li, and Lorente 
2010). 
The underlying rationale of the institutional logic argument runs as follows: 
introduction of a new logic creates discourses and tensions within the existing 
institutional field (Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy 2004). Actors supporting a new 
logic form a social group, construct a new group identity, and develop shared beliefs 
to establish the legitimacy of the new logic in the field (Davis and Thompson 1994; 
Rao, Monin, and Durand 2003; Tilly 1978). In contrast, actors rejecting the new logic 
enforce their own logic and isolate themselves from the new logic in order to protect 
their own beliefs (Marquis and Lounsbury 2007). This institutionalization process 
deepens conflict in logics, which often leads to additional logic formation. 
Similarly, in the technological field, multiple and competing institutional 
logics can influence technological evolution. Bijker (1987) stresses the role of 
technological frames defined as a set of community-level theories, tacit knowledge 
and daily practices that help solve problems in technology development. Scholars 
suggest that a group of scientists and engineers who share similar values, beliefs and 
norms tend to use their own technological frames to understand the meaning and 
socio-economic value of new technology (e.g., Orlikowski and Gash 1994; Pinch and 
Bijker 1987).  
In a similar vein, other scholars building upon community of practice 
approaches suggest that practices shared by group members foster the sharing of 




1991; Lave and Wenger 1991; Orlikowski 1992). When social groups with different 
technological frames are competing, each group tends to promote its own frame or 
often redefines it.  
The notion of technological frame is not limited to the technologists’ frame. 
Rather, Bijker (1987) suggests that it incorporates frames of consumers and 
manufacturers, as well as technology inventors, revolving around technology. The 
technological frame thus reflects institutional logics in the technological field. Akrich 
(1992) further argues that technology is realized as a way of inscribing inventors’ 
beliefs about the relationship between technology and its users, suggesting that 
technology and community of practices co-evolve.  
Institutional scholars argue that the extent to which an institutional logic is 
taken for granted in a certain institutional field determines the differential evolution 
of social practices (Greenwood, Díaz, Li, and Lorente 2010; Lounsbury 2007). 
Following this theoretical insight, the prevalence of institutional logics or institutions 
has been considered a proxy of the degree to which a logic is “taken-for-granted.” 
While the breadth of shared beliefs of actors somehow captures the degree of taken-
for-grantedness, it does not necessarily reflect the strength of actors’ collective 
beliefs. Actors’ mimetic adoption resulting from their legitimacy-seeking behaviors 
can take place during the diffusion of new practices or technologies. However, when 
it comes to institutional change where actors deconstruct an old institution and create 
a new one, the absence of strong beliefs may not lead to institutional change. There 




shared beliefs, particularly connectivity among actors who share the similar 
institutional logic. 
The importance of the strength of collective beliefs has been discussed in 
different literatures. Bijker (1987) argues that technologists’ strong inclusiveness in 
their technological frame tends to hinder their adoption of other technology distant 
from their own frames, thereby stalling breakthrough technological innovation. In 
addition, social movement theory also highlights that actors’ strong commitment to 
shared beliefs promotes group members’ exchange of information and resources 
within the group—and thus increases the effectiveness of collective actions (e.g., 
Tilly, 1978).  
As I discussed earlier, an environmental logic has long competed with an 
industrial logic in the electric vehicle arena (e.g., Sachs 1999). In considering the 
history of automotive technology during the period of 1969-2009, it is evident that the 
emergence of hybrid drive is an outcome of logic contestation. Although electric 
vehicles have been regarded as a cleaner, technically more efficient and less noisy 
technology, an industrial logic supported by business sectors, labor unions and a 
group of engineers has been blunting the optimism about electric vehicles. Whether 
electric vehicles can achieve technical and economic efficiency or whether the 
existing infrastructure is compatible with electric vehicles has been long discussed in 
the technological and sociocultural fields (Kirsch 2000; Sachs 1999).  
While an environmental logic has provided social and cultural support for the 
further development of pure electric drive, an industrial logic hinders the emergence 




technological improvement. Competition between the two logics resulted in the 
creation of a new technology—hybrid drive which incorporates both environmental 
and industrial logics. In particular, when both logics strongly influence the 
technological field, rather than one dominating the other, hybrid drive will be more 
likely to emerge. This is because stronger contestation between the two logics triggers 
public and hostile debates which force actors to seek some form of hybridization 
(Glynn and Lounsbury 2005; Schneiberg and Bartley 2001). I therefore offer the 
following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Stronger cohesion networks among actors in an environmental logic 
will increase the likelihood of an actor’s acceptance of pure electric drive in the 
technological field. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Stronger cohesion networks among actors in an industrial logic will 
decrease the likelihood of an actor’s acceptance of pure electric drive in the 
technological field. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Stronger cohesion networks among actors in both industrial and 
environmental logics will jointly increase the likelihood of an actor’s acceptance of 




2. 3. Method 
2. 3. 1. Data 
Professional meetings have been identified as a critical locus of open 
discussion of new technology and innovation (e.g., Waguespack and Fleming 2009). 
To explore an actor’s incorporation of new institutional logics and technologies, I 
analyze the proceedings of the international Electric Vehicle Symposium (EVS) from 




engineers and policymakers could exchange technical information about electric 
vehicle technologies. Forty years later, this symposium has expanded to play a critical 
role in introducing the state-of-the-art technologies associated with electric 
transportation into global markets. A total of 24 volumes of EVS proceedings have 
been published by symposium organizers as of 2009 (See Table 2 for an overview). 
The EVS proceedings are not uniform over the study period, but they usually include 
research papers, authors’ institutional affiliations and brief biographies, countries of 
origin, authors’ contact information, organizing committees, sponsors, exhibitors, and 
technical specifications of on-site technology demonstrations called “ride and drives.” 
*** Insert Table 2 about here *** 
Information about authors’ country of origin, institutional affiliations, paper 
titles, keywords, abstract and main texts was extracted from the original proceedings. 
This initial sample includes 6,926 authors from 57 nations authoring 3,282 papers. 
Among these authors, 44% are scientists, engineers and researchers who work for 
firms; 34% of authors are from universities; and 15% are affiliated with government-
sponsored research institutions or independent private research institutions. 
Government and municipal officials comprise 5% of authors. Others include 
politicians and non-government organizations.  
Data were constructed at the author-level to allow for the examination of an 
author’s incorporation of institutional logics and technologies. In total, my initial 
sample has 11,680 author-year observations. Because it takes time to publish research 
papers at the conferences, I lagged some of the variables in my specifications (I 




proceedings from the initial sample EVS 1 and 2. As a result, the final sample 
includes 6,711 authors, 3,155 proceedings and 11,421 author-year observations. 
To measure the intensity of social movement activity, I obtained 
environmental movement events from the New York Times. The social movement 
literature has demonstrated that national newspapers are valid sources for capturing 
social movement activity (e.g., Earl, Martin, McCarthy, and Soule 2004; Kennedy 
2008; King and Soule 2007). Moreover, King and Soule (2007) specifically show that 
news articles about social movement events collected from the New York Times are 
more comprehensive than articles from other national newspapers such as the 
Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal. I thus use the New York Times to obtain 
information about environmental protests from 1969-2009.  
Finally, to measure prevailing economic and environmental factors, I 
collected annual U.S. unemployment rates, U.S. oil and gas prices, average domestic 
passenger car prices, and carbon dioxide emissions from the U.S. Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration and the U.S. Department of Energy.  
Annual environmental protests and macroeconomic indicators are combined 
with the EVS proceedings to produce a final dataset that is an unbalanced author-
level panel. 
 
2. 3. 2. Dependent Variables 
Actors’ incorporation of new institutional logics and technologies is measured 




logics by using session themes to which an author’s paper belongs, and abstract and 
keywords from the author’s paper. When abstract and keywords are not provided, the 
main content of a paper was examined. If a paper discusses environmental and 
ecological issues such as air and noise pollution, safety, human health, emissions, 
environmental impacts, sustainability, or fuel saving, I categorize the paper as an 
environmental logic. Thus a variable ENVIRONMENTAL LOGIC is coded as one if 
the paper covers an environmental logic; and otherwise is coded as zero (see Table 3 
for the detailed coding framework). To validate the reliability of coding, I first 
randomly selected 100 articles. Two research assistants then independently coded the 
selected articles based on the coding framework. Average percentage agreement 
across three coders was 92 percent. Krippendorff’s alpha was .83, which indicates 
excellent agreement by chance (Krippendorff 2004; Neuendorf 2002).  
On the other hand, if a paper’s main topic related to market strategies, 
standardization, techno-economic efficiency and performance, commercialization, 
and infrastructure, a variable labeled as INDUSTRIAL LOGIC is one; and zero 
otherwise. Similarly to the variable ENVIRONMENTAL LOGIC, I calculate average 
percentage agreement and Krippendorff’s alpha across three coders. Average 
percentage agreement and Krippendorff’s alpha were 94 percent and .71 respectively, 
which indicates good agreement by chance (Krippendorff 2004; Neuendorf 2002). 
When a paper considers issues that relate to both industrial and environmental logics, 
both INDUSTRIAL LOGIC and ENVIRONMENTAL LOGIC are coded as one. 




Similarly, the variable labeled as ELECTRIC DRIVE is coded as one if a 
paper’s main topic of technology is related to the pure electric vehicle; and zero 
otherwise. A variable HYBRID DRIVE is coded as one if a paper discusses 
technology associated with the combination of internal combustion engine and 
electric motors or/and batteries; and zero otherwise. When both electric and hybrid 
drive is discussed in a paper, the variables ELECTRIC DRIVE and HYBRID DRIVE 
are coded as one. 
*** Insert Table 4 about here *** 
 
2. 3. 3. Independent Variables 
Social movement activity, the variable ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEST, is 
measured as the total number of environmental protest events covered by the New 
York Times in a given year. Environmental protest events covered by the New York 
Times include both domestic and international protests associated with environmental 
pollution. Following the prior social movement literature (Earl, Martin, McCarthy, 
and Soule 2004; Earl and Soule 2006), I counted environmental protests events in 
which more than one actor participated at the public place. Labor-related events, 
lawsuits, letter-writing campaigns, environmental “teach-ins”, public hearings and 
environment-related conferences are not included (see Earl and Soule 2006 for the 
detailed criteria). 
Because it takes time to publish a research paper, contemporaneous 
environmental movements do not necessarily influence the topics of that year’s 




research projects from which the research proceedings are published. In order to find 
the appropriate time lags, I first interviewed several conference participants who 
stated that the publication cycle in these engineering fields is within three years, in 
general, and that they submitted research proceedings to the international EVS within 
one or two years after the initial research project had begun. Given this understanding 
from the interviews, I used a series of lagged variables: one-, two-, three-, and four- 
year lags of ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEST. The results also show that the effects 
of three- and four-year lags on an author’s incorporation of institutional logics and 
technologies are not statistically significant. Thus, I use a two-year lag of 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEST in all specifications. 
In order to capture economic recessions, annual U.S. unemployment rates, 
labeled as US UNEMPLOYMENT, are collected from the database of the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Out of several macroeconomic indicators, unemployment 
rates are used to capture economic recessions for the following reasons. First, the 
unemployment rate is widely considered one of macroeconomic indicators capturing 
economic recessions. Moreover, unemployment rates are closely related to labor 
unions’ activity. As discussed earlier, during economic recessions, industries 
influenced by stringent environmental standards lobbied for lowering environmental 
standards. In particular, labor unions in the automobile and steel industries joined 
these efforts, claiming that higher environmental standards increase cost pressure on 
business sectors, which results in large-scale layoffs. Thus, the unemployment rate 




case of ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT, I use a two-year lag of US 
UNEMPLOYMENT. 
Finally, to capture the degree of cohesion networks of the institutional logics, 
I calculate the network density of authors for each institutional logic (c.f., Burt 2005). 
If two authors coauthored a paper which incorporates an environmental logic in a 
given year, they have a direct environmental logic tie. These direct ties are used to 
calculate the network density within the environmental logic. The variable 
COHESION NETWORKS ENVIRONMENTAL LOGIC is defined as a total number 
of direct ties divided by maximum possible ties among authors in a given year. 
Similarly, I calculate the density of co-authorship networks in the industrial 
logic. I define COHESION NETWORKS INDUSTRIAL LOGIC as the total number 
of direct ties scaled by maximum possible ties. Higher values of both measures 
represent stronger cohesion networks of the institutional logics.2 As with 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEST and US UNEMPLOYMENT, two-year lags of 
COHESION NETWORKS ENVIRONMENTAL LOGIC and COHESION 
NETWORKS INDUSTRIAL LOGIC are used, because the strength of institutional 
logics may influence authors when they actually begin their research projects. 
 
2. 3. 4. Control Variables 
In addition to the main variables of interest, I include a set of control variables 
to account for potential alternative explanations. I first control for the prevalence of 
institutional logics that potentially influences actors’ embracing of technologies (e.g., 
                                                 
2 Because the maximum values of the cohesion networks of both environmental and industrial logics 
are relatively small (.09 and .02 respectively), I multiply these scores by 1000 to make it easier to 




Sine, Haveman, and Tolbert 2005). To do this, I first measure the size of both 
environmental and industrial logics by counting the total number of authors having 
incorporated each institutional logic in a given year. I then calculate change rates of 
those logics in a given year. As noted above, I use the two-year lags of Δ 
ENVIRONMENT LOGIC and Δ ENVIRONMENTAL LOGIC. 
I also include authors’ affiliations and home countries to control for 
institution-specific effects. Based on the information provided in the authors’ 
biographies, I categorize authors’ affiliations into five categories: universities, 
governments, government-sponsored research institutions, independent private 
research institutions and for-profit companies. To control for possible country-
specific effects, I create dummy variables CANADA, CHINA, GERMANY, 
FRANCE, ITALY, JAPAN, KOREA, UK and US. 
Average annual prices of gasoline, oil and internal combustion engine cars are 
collected from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and the U.S. Department of 
Energy. Internal combustion engine vehicles have been major competitors to electric 
and hybrid vehicles for more than a century (Kirsch 2000; Mom 2004; Sachs 1992). 
In particular, scholars have demonstrated that the prices of oil, gas and internal 
combustion engine vehicles appropriately capture the competitiveness of internal 
combustion engine vehicles such as quality, cost competitiveness and techno-
economic efficiency (e.g., Rosen 1974). To account for substitution effects, I include 
the annual price changes of oil and internal combustion engine vehicles.3 Variables Δ 
                                                 
3 Because gasoline prices are highly correlated with oil prices, I include only one of the two variables 
in the specification. In lieu of gasoline price, I prefer including oil price, because oil price may 
influence other business sectors in which oil is a major input to produce their products and services and 




US OIL PRICE and Δ US CAR PRICE are defined as price changes scaled by the 
previous prices respectively. I also used two-year lags of Δ US OIL PRICE and Δ US 
CAR PRICE.  
Finally, to control for unobserved heterogeneity and external shocks (e.g., 
Bresnahan 1987), I consider technology-fixed effects and time-fixed effects as 
controls in my specifications.4 Performance of motors and electric storage batteries 
has been perceived as a major technical hurdle in developing electric and hybrid 
vehicles. Over the course of the study period, several new types of motors and electric 
storage batteries have been developed, and their respective advantages and 
disadvantages have been discussed in the EVS community. I include dummy 
variables of AC-, DC-, induction-, permanent magnet-, switched reluctance- and 
capacitor/flywheel- based motors to control for motor-specific effects. Likewise, to 
control for battery-fixed effects, I include dummies of lead acid, fuel cell, and 
lithium-, nickel- and zinc air-based batteries. Table 4 summarizes the definitions of 
variables described in this section. 
 
2. 3. 5. Statistical Method 
Because the dependent variables in this study are binary, I employ a probit 
regression model: 
                                                       (1) 
                                                 
4 When year dummies are included in each specification, some year dummies are automatically 
excluded because of multicolinearity. As a result, each specification includes a different set of year 
dummies, depending on the multicolinearity between year dummies and yearly measured variables in 
the specification. Because the overall results with or without year dummies are consistent, and because 
each specification should have the same set of variables to compare the marginal effects across 




where Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function,  φ(z), a first order 
derivative of Φ(·) is the standard normal probability density function, y is a dependent 
variable, x represents a vector of explanatory variables, and β  is a vector of 
coefficient estimates.  
As expressed in equation (1), the probit model does not directly predict the 
probability of yi = 1 but zi which is then mapped to the probability of yi = 1 in the 
standard normal cumulative distribution function. This feature makes it difficult to 
directly interpret the coefficients of the probit model (Cameron and Trivedi 2005; 
Greene 2003). I thus calculate the marginal effects, a partial derivative of the standard 
normal distribution function with respect to the mean of xj. The marginal effect of xj 
represents the magnitude of a probability change per unit increase in xj at the point of 
its mean. Equation (2) formally represents the marginal effects calculated in this 
study: 
                                                                          (2) 
where  is a vector of the means of explanatory variables and  is the predicted 
value of coefficient estimates. 
 
2. 4. Results 
2. 4. 1. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations. The means of 
environmental logic and industrial logic are .37 and .94, showing that around one 




incorporate elements of the industrial logic. Thirty-one percent (= .37 + .94 - 1) of 
authors incorporate both environmental and industrial logics in their papers. 
Interestingly, COHESION NETWORKS ENVIRONMENTAL LOGIC is double that 
of COHESION NETWORKS INDUSTRIAL LOGIC, indicating that prima facie the 
cohesion networks of the environmental logic group is stronger than that of the 
industrial logic. With regard to vehicle types, 38% of authors discussed hybrid drive 
whereas 71% of authors have written papers related to pure electric drive. Nine 
percent of authors have discussed both electric and hybrid drive (= .38 + .71 - 1). 
*** Insert Table 5 about here *** 
As I hypothesized, the results of bivariate correlations show that 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEST is positively related to ENVIRONMENTAL 
LOGIC but is negatively related to INDUSTRIAL LOGIC. Conversely, US 
UNEMPLOYMENT is negatively related to ENVIRONMENTAL LOGIC while 
positively related to INDUSTRIAL LOGIC. As for the relationships between the 
degree of cohesion networks of logics and actors’ acceptance of vehicle types, the 
results indicate that the degree of cohesion networks of both logics is positively 
associated with ELECTRIC DRIVE while negatively associated with HYBRID 
DRIVE. Since these are bivariate correlations, which do not consider other control 
variables that potentially and simultaneously influence these relationships, I exercise 
caution in interpreting these results and therefore turn to multivariate regression 





2. 4. 2. Regression Results 
Table 6 presents the results of the probit regressions in which I test hypotheses 
1a, 1b, 2a and 2b. In models 1 and 2 I test the effects of environmental protests and 
unemployment rate on an actor’s incorporation of an industrial logic. In model 1 I 
include control variables only. While authors from most countries are positively 
concerned about an industrial logic, authors from Canada are less likely to consider 
the industrial logic in their papers. Interestingly, authors from China, a major 
emerging economy, show the strongest country effect on the incorporation of an 
industrial logic. With respect to institution-specific effects, not surprisingly, authors 
from the industry sectors are most likely to incorporate an industrial logic, whereas 
government officials are least likely to discuss an industrial logic. An increase in CO2 
emissions is negatively associated with an actor’s incorporation of an industrial logic. 
*** Insert Table 6 about here *** 
In model 2 I include two-year lags of ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEST and 
US UNEMPLOYMENT. Hypotheses 1b and 2b posit that environmental protests 
(economic recessions) in the sociocultural arena will decrease (increase) the 
likelihood of an actor’s incorporation of an industrial logic. As I hypothesized, the 
results show that environmental protests negatively and significantly influence an 
actor’s incorporation of an industrial logic (β = -.008; p < .01), while the effect of 
unemployment rates is positive and significant (β = .048; p < .05). Thus, hypotheses 
1b and 2b are supported. In order to interpret the magnitude of probability changes, I 
calculate the marginal effects and report them in the column next to the coefficients. 




decrease the probability of an actor’s incorporating an industrial logic by .001 and 
that one unit increase in US UNEMPLOYMENT will increase its probability by .005. 
In models 3 and 4 I include the same set of explanatory variables and predict 
the probability of an actor’s incorporating an environmental logic. Model 3 shows the 
results with only control variables included. Unlike the results in model 1, authors 
from most countries are less likely to discuss environmental issues. Interestingly, only 
authors from Italy are more likely to incorporate an environmental logic. Canadian 
authors (who showed a negative propensity to incorporate an industrial logic) are 
more likely to incorporate an environmental logic, although the effect is not 
significant. Government officials and researchers from the independent private 
research institutions are most likely to discuss the issues associated with an 
environmental logic. While an increase in U.S. passenger car prices is negatively and 
significantly related to an actor’s incorporation of an environmental logic, the effect 
of an increase in U.S. oil prices is positive.  
In model 4 I include the variables ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEST and US 
UNEMPLOYMENT to test hypotheses 1a and 2a, suggesting a positive relationship 
between environmental protests and an actor’s incorporation of an environmental 
logic; and a negative relationship between economic recessions and an actor’s 
incorporation of an environmental logic. The effect of ENVIRONMENTAL PROEST 
is positive but not significant (β = .002; p > .10). Hence, hypothesis 1a is not 
supported. However, US UNEMPLOYMENT is negatively and significantly 
associated with an actor’s incorporation of an environmental logic (β = -.046; p < 




indicates that one unit increase in the unemployment rate will decrease the probability 
of an actor’s incorporating an environmental logic by .017. 
In Table 7 I test hypotheses 3 and 4, positing the relationships between the 
degree of cohesion networks in logics and an actor’s acceptance of vehicle types. In 
addition to the control variables included in the previous regressions, I further include 
technology fixed effects and institutional logic effects as control variables, which 
potentially influence an actor’s acceptance of technologies. 
*** Insert Table 7 about here *** 
Model 5 includes control variables and predicts the propensity of an actor’s 
embracing of ELECTRIC DRIVE. In general, authors from most countries, except for 
Japan, are less likely to discuss electric drive. Governmental officials show strong 
interests in pure electric drive. An increase in oil price is negatively related to an 
actor’s embrace of electric drive, but an increase in passenger car price is positively 
related to an actor’s embrace of electric drive. A higher level of CO2 emissions tends 
to increase the likelihood of an actor’s embrace of electric drive. DC MOTOR, FUEL 
CELL BATTERY, LEAD ACID BATTERY, and ZINCAIR-BASED BATTERY are 
positively associated with ELECTRIC DRIVE. Interestingly, Δ ENVIRONMENTAL 
LOGIC is positively related to ELECTRIC DRIVE whereas Δ INDUSTRIAL LOGIC 
is negatively related to ELECTRIC DRIVE.  
In model 6 I include variables of COHESION NETWORKS 
ENVIRONMENTAL LOGIC and COHESION NETWORKS INDUSTRIAL LOGIC 
to test hypotheses 3 and 4 in which I expected that the strong cohesion networks of an 




embracing of electric drive. As I predicted, the results show that the effect of 
COHESION NETWORKS ENVIRONMENTAL LOGIC is positive and significant 
(β = .039; p < .01) and that the effect of COHESION NETWORKS INDUSTRIAL 
LOGIC is negative and significant (β = -.072; p < .01). The marginal effects of these 
two variables are .013 and -.023 respectively, indicating that one unit increase in the 
cohesion networks of an environmental logic will increase the probability of an 
actor’s discussing electric drive by .013; but one unit increase in the cohesion 
networks of an industrial logic will decrease its probability by .023. These results 
support hypotheses 3 and 4. 
To test hypothesis 5 in which I posited that an actor will be more likely to 
embrace hybrid drive when both institutional logics are highly cohesive, in model 8 I 
first include the same set of variables as those in model 6 and predict the probability 
of an actor’s embracing hybrid drive. The results show that COHESION 
NETWORKS ENVIRONMENTAL LOGIC is negatively associated with HYBRID 
DRIVE, but COHESION NETWORKS INDUSTRIAL LOGIC is positively related 
to HYBRID DRIVE.  
To further explore the joint effect of the cohesion networks of two logics, I 
split the sample into two groups by using the median of COHESION NETWORKS 
ENVIRONMENTAL LOGIC.5 Table 8 presents the results. In the case of high 
COHESION NETWORKS ENVIRONMENTAL LOGIC the effect of COHESION 
NETWORKS INDUSTRIAL LOGIC is negative and significant (β = -.090; p < .01). 
However, in the case of low COHESION NETWORKS ENVIRONMENTAL 
                                                 
5 I also conducted the different subsample splits by using the mean and quartiles. The results are 




LOGIC, I find a positive and significant relationship between COHESION 
NETWORKS INDUSTRIAL LOGIC and HYBRID DRIVE (β = .807; p < .01). I 
also conduct a t-test of marginal effects of COHESION NETWORKS INDUSTRIAL 
LOGIC across models 9 and 10. The difference in marginal effects is significant at 
the .01 significance level. These results together indicate that when the industrial 
logic group is more cohesive but the environmental logic group is less cohesive, 
actors are more likely to embrace hybrid drive, which refutes my hypothesis 5. 
*** Insert Table 8 about here *** 
 
2. 4. 3. Sensitivity and Robustness 
To assess the sensitivity and robustness of the results, I tested several different 
models.6 One of the critical issues is how to control for endogeneity when multiple 
binary outcome models are used. If one binary outcome is a function of the other 
binary outcome, and if this endogeneity is not taken into account, then the results may 
be biased. In this study, if an actor’s incorporation of a certain type of an institutional 
logic systematically influences the actor’s choice of topics associated with electric or 
hybrid drive, the omission of the variables ENVIRONMENTAL LOGIC and 
INDUSTRIAL LOGIC in the right hand side of the equation in models 5-10 will lead 
to biased coefficient estimates. Two lines of discussion have emerged to take into 
account this sort of endogeneity (Maddala 1986). One line of research focuses on 
whether Heckman’s two-step approximation or least-squares approximation (i.e. 
2SLS and 3SLS) can be applied to the case in which the dependent variables are all 
                                                 




binary outcomes. Van de Ven and Van Praag (1981) demonstrate that the Heckman’s 
two-step procedure can work well in the case of the bivariate probit model with 
sample selection, if the heteroscedasticity is appropriately corrected. Furthermore, 
Wilde (2000) suggests that Heckman’s two-step approximation can be applied to the 
multivariate probit model. However, correction of heteroscedasticity is still an 
important issue to be solved in this case (Bhattacharya, Goldman, and McCaffrey 
2006). Another line of research suggests a multivariate probit model, by using a 
Geweke–Hajivassilou–Keane simulator to take into account the correlation among 
error terms across probit equations (e.g., Geweke, Keane, and Runkle 1994; Jenkins, 
Cappellari, Lynn, Jäckle, and Sala 2006). A multivariate probit model has been 
commonly used in the case of multiple binary outcomes (e.g., Ingram, Yue, and Rao 
2010; Jenkins, Cappellari, Lynn, Jäckle, and Sala 2006). Table 9 presents the 
comparison between the results from multivariate probit models and those from 
univariate probit models. Overall results are consistent. 
*** Insert Table 9 about here *** 
Another important issue is the existence of unobserved factors, which may 
influence actors’ choice of topics associated with logics and technologies. I 
additionally ran conditional logit regressions, by which I control for author-specific 
unobserved factors. There is only limited variation among demographic factors, 
resulting in the sample size being reduced to around 3,000. However, overall results 
were consistent with those reported herein. 
Third, market demand effects such as commercial success or failure and 




agenda. The General Motors EV1 pure electric vehicle was launched in the US market 
on December 2, 1996. The Toyota Prius and Honda Insight hybrid vehicles were first 
introduced in Japan in 1997 and 1999, and later in the US market in 1999 and 2000, 
respectively. To account for the demand-side effects, I dropped the observations from 
2001 to 2009 and re-ran the same regressions reported in this study.7 Overall results 
are consistent with those reported herein. 
Fourth, social movement activity and actors’ incorporation of logics and 
technologies may also be influenced by political conditions. To control for this, I 
included the variable representing political regimes—democratic versus republican 
administrations. Interestingly, during the democratic administration, electric 
technologists are more likely to incorporate an environmental logic but less likely to 
incorporate an industrial logic. Furthermore, the results show that during the 
democratic administration, actors tend to support pure electric vehicles rather than 
hybrid vehicles. Despite the inclusion of political conditions, overall results remain 
consistent. 
Finally, due to data availability, I used U.S.-based macroeconomic variables 
to capture unemployment rates, oil and car prices, and CO2 emissions, assuming that 
the U.S. economy and pollution levels are equivalent with overall patterns of world 
economies and pollution levels. In order to check the viability of using U.S.-based 
variables as proxies for capturing world-level economies and pollution, I tested the 
same models reported in this study with only U.S. authors and domestic 
                                                 
7 Because I use two-year lags of the yearly measured variables, I dropped the observations from 2001 




environmental protests included. The results are consistent with those of the full 
sample.  
The results of these robustness checks demonstrate that the findings presented 
in this study are not merely driven by the unique characteristics of the statistical 
methods or data. Rather, they show that there are significant effects of social 
movements and economic recessions on an actor’s incorporation of logics. Moreover, 
the results suggest that institutional logics, more precisely cohesiveness among actors 
in institutional logics, substantially influence the differential evolution of electric and 
hybrid drive. 
 
2. 5. Discussion 
In this study I seek to explore the social and institutional processes shaping 
differential technology development. Combining the social movements and 
institutional logic arguments, I argue that an institutional logic is a product of actors’ 
collective actions, and that institutional logics can systematically determine 
differential trajectories of technology development. To test my arguments, I examine 
the processes of technology and logic construction in the international arena of 
electric vehicles from 1969-2009. I find that environmental protests have a negative 
effect on an actor’s incorporation of an industrial logic; whereas high unemployment 
rates have a positive effect on it. In addition, I find that high unemployment rates 
preclude an actor’s incorporation of an environmental logic. These empirical findings 
suggest that environmental movements and economic conditions are closely related to 




I further find that the strength of actors’ beliefs in a given logic—
operationalized as coauthorship density—systematically influences differential 
developmental trajectories of new technologies. That is, the strong cohesion networks 
of an environmental logic positively influence an actor’s choice of topics associated 
with electric drive; whereas those of an industrial logic negatively influence an 
actor’s embrace of electric drive. As opposed to my prediction, I find that discussion 
of hybrid drive has become prevalent when the strength of an industrial logic is high 
but that of an environmental logic is low. This result suggests that the emergence of 
hybrid drive may not be an outcome of the hybridization of two competing logics. 
Rather, it may be that hybrid drive emerges as a result of the dominance of an 
institutional logic. 
This study has several theoretical implications. First, this study bridges the 
gap between the social movements and institutional logic literatures, suggesting that 
institutional logics can wax and wane, depending on social and economic conditions, 
although they persist and continue to influence actors. Institutional logics are 
endogenous. Social actors collectively create a new logic or provide different 
meanings with the existing logics. Examination of this process in this study helps us 
better understand the origin and development of institutional logics.  
Second, this study contributes to the extant technology literature in that it 
examines social and institutional processes shaping technology development. The 
extant technology literature largely focusing on techno-economic influences on 
technology development is somewhat limited and incomplete, because technology 




this study provide a better understanding of why certain technologies become 
dominant but others limp along or disappear. This study shows that social movements 
and economic conditions indirectly shape the process of technology construction in 
the technological community, and that degree of cohesiveness among actors’ logics is 
closely associated with the emergence or decline of technology. 
Third, this study extends the existing entrepreneurship literature. The existing 
entrepreneurship literature suggests that introduction of new technology not only 
fosters competition in technologies, but also creates framing conflict in actors’ 
interpretations associated with the meaning and value of the new technology (Barley 
1986; Bijker 1987). Munir and Phillips (2005) further demonstrate that new 
technology often creates new social roles and shapes actors’ life styles. What is 
missing is where new technology comes from. This study shows how social and 
institutional forces systematically influence technological trajectories, prior to the 
introduction of the product to the market.  
In addition to the theoretical contributions, this study has several practical 
implications. First, this study suggests that entrepreneurial success in the 
technological field is not merely attributed to a single entrepreneur or a single firm. 
Rather, it involves a larger scale commitment of actors in different institutional fields. 
Thus, when managers or entrepreneurs intend to introduce new technology, it is 
important to trace current socio-economic trends, values, dominant logics, lifestyles 
and even abstract-level ideology.  
Second, this study highlights the openness of technology development. 




shows that logic contestation, particularly the strength of logics, is closely related to 
differential trajectories of technology development. Attention to institutional logics 
within the technological community may be essential for future technological 
success. 
Finally, this study shows the importance of managing institutional logics. 
Although institutional logics serve as a critical determinant of future trajectories of 
technology development, institutional logics are not merely exogenously given. It is 
social actors who collectively and strategically mobilize resources and manage 
institutional logics. 
While this study has several important theoretical and practical implications, I 
acknowledge several caveats of this study and thus provide avenues for future 
research. First, this study primarily focuses on actors’ discussion of technology in the 
professional society of electric and hybrid vehicles. Thus, this study does not 
incorporate consumers’ logics which may potentially influence technological 
evolution. A possible extension of this study would explore what are consumers’ 
institutional logics associated with automotive technology, and how the consumers’ 
logics influence technological evolution. 
Second, I focus on a single conference in the community of automotive 
technologists. Although the EVS is one of the most established and legitimate 
international conferences, I do not know whether my findings necessarily generalize 
to other automotive conferences. 
Finally, because the context of this study is the emergence of automotive 




other types of technology. I am thus cautious to generalize my findings to other 
technological contexts. Corroboratory research in different technological contexts 
would strengthen my arguments.   
Technological evolution has been widely examined in the fields of 
organization theory and strategy. This study contributes to the existing literature by 
exploring endogenous social and institutional processes influencing technological 
evolution. Importantly, I bridge the gap between social movements and institutional 
logic literatures, to better understand the complex phenomenon of technological 
development. Empirical evidence suggests that social movements and economic 
conditions influence logic competition within the technological community. The 
findings also emphasize the role of institutional logics in the emergence and decline 
of technology within a particular setting. 
 
 




Chapter 3: Tracing the Evolution of Institutional Logics in 
the Electric Automotive Community 
 
In this chapter I explore how social actors faced with multiple and conflicting 
institutional logics manage multiple institutional logics. While much of institutional 
work has suggested and empirically demonstrated that institutional logics shape 
cognitive and behavioral patterns of actors, what still remains unanswered is how 
actors collectively construct the meanings of institutional logics when facing 
competing institutional logics. Borrowing from the perspectives of institutional logics 
and collective actions, I argue that actors strategically create new meanings, modify a 
current institutional logic, and reinforce the new meanings rather than passively 
adopting institutional logics.  
To trace temporal changes in meanings which constitute competing 
institutional logics, I conduct an inductive study, employing computer-aided text 
analysis. Using research proceedings published by the international Electric Vehicle 
Symposium in 1969 and 1994, I found four social mechanisms of logic construction: 
clarifying, patching, expanding and reinforcing. Moreover, empirical findings suggest 
that the social mechanisms of patching, expanding and reinforcing are closely related 
to the emergence of hybrid drive.  
This study directly enriches the existing institutional logic literature in that it 
empirically demonstrates how institutional logics are constructed over time, rather 
than remaining stable and unidirectionally influencing behavior and cognition of 
actors. Another important contribution is that this study shows how actors collectively 




the results address a long-standing theoretical tension between dualism and duality in 
organizational sociology, by identifying middle-range social mechanisms which 
together influence both structure and agency. Finally, this study contributes to the 
current technology literature, by showing how actors can collectively determine 
future developmental trajectories of new technologies via the social construction of 
institutional logics. 
 
3. 1. Introduction 
Institutional change is a social phenomenon that institutional scholars have 
long sought to understand (Scott, Ruef, Mendel, and Caronna 2000; Tolbert and 
Zucker 1983). Early work on institutional change has suggested that external shocks 
and techno-economic needs foster deinstitutionalization (Fligstein 2001; Oliver 1992; 
Tolbert and Zucker 1983). Some scholars in the organizational strategy field develop 
a view of strategic actions that emphasizes organizational variations under 
institutional pressures (Elsbach 1994; Oliver 1991; Fligstein 2001; Suchman 1995; 
Seo and Creed 2002). More recently, institutional scholars have begun to focus on the 
interplay between actors and institutions, and they are paying more attention to 
cognitive and cultural processes influencing creation, development and diffusion of 
practices within the institutional field (Zietsma and Lawrence 2010; Zilber 2002; 
2006). 
Relatedly, scholars have revisited the notion of “institutional logics” and seek 
to understand their roles in institutional change (e.g., Thornton 2002). Institutional 




actors (Friedland and Alford 1991; Thornton and Ocasio 2008). Institutional logics 
provide actors with rules and principles through which actors makes sense of 
institutions (Thornton 2004). Borrowing from the institutional logic perspective, a 
body of studies on institutional logics has found structural outcomes of institutional 
logics (e.g., Greenwood, Díaz, Li, and Lorente 2010; Lounsbury 2007; Marquis and 
Lounsbury 2007; Thornton 2002). However, much of empirical work still revolves 
around the unitary isomorphism argument emphasizing institutional pressures. 
Alford and Friedland (1985) originally suggest that actors in modern society 
encounter multiple institutional logics, which often conflict with one another. 
Fundamental questions that as of yet remain unanswered are how individual actors 
manage these conflicting logics, whether institutional logics homogeneously 
influence actors’ cognition and behaviors, and whether institutional logics can be 
shaped by actors. Answering these questions will help us to gain a better 
understanding of the social dynamics of institutional change. 
Recent work, drawing upon the pluralistic view of institutional logics, has just 
begun to pay attention to the roles of actors in managing competing institutional 
logics, and shows the temporal fluctuation of institutional logics (e.g., Dunn and 
Jones 2010). Less is known about nuances and dynamics of processes of logic 
construction. The social constructivist view provides some theoretical mechanisms by 
which actors manage conflicting institutional logics. For example, Thornton and 
Ocasio (2008) argue that meanings of institutional logics are socially constructed. 
Actors purposefully enact their interpretations of institutional logics, develop shared 




view of institutional logics implicitly suggests that actors can change existing 
institutions, or at least the meanings of institutions, through the mechanism of logic 
construction, highlighting the roles of actors in institutional logics. Other scholars 
have paid attention to collective actions as a source of creating a new institutional 
logic (for a review see Fligstein and McAdam 2011).  
Although fundamental, our understanding of creation, development and 
transformation of institutional logics is largely understudied. In particular, less is 
known regarding the process of framing the meanings of institutional logics. 
Moreover, when it comes to technology development, we know little about how or 
whether institutional logics can shape technology development. Recent technology 
literature has begun to underscore the role of institutional logics in technology 
development (Kaplan and Murray 2010; Kaplan and Tripsas 2008). However, 
empirical work is yet limited. 
The purpose of this study, therefore, is to explore how actors in a 
technological community mobilize multiple and conflicting institutional logics, and 
how the different construction of institutional logics shapes technological 
development. I specifically focus on the technological discourse about electric and 
hybrid drives in the international Electric Vehicle Symposium. I have chosen this 
technological context partly because automobile industries have been closely 
associated with multiple institutional fields in general, partly because multiple 
technologies (i.e. pure electric, hybrid, and internal combustion engine vehicles) have 
been long competing with one another, and partly because social groups with 




competing technologies. Therefore, it would be an interesting empirical setting where 
I can explore the sociocultural complexity and dynamics among actors, institutional 
logics and technologies. 
In order to trace meanings of institutional logics, I conducted an inductive 
study based on the history of electric vehicles and keyword-based, computer-aided 
text analysis. I identify two competing institutional logics (Environmentalism vs. 
Industrialism) impacting this technological community. I then trace how technologists 
in EVS mobilize the two institutional logics over time. Using research proceedings 
published by the EVS in 1969 and in 1994, I found four social mechanisms of 
constructing institutional logics: clarifying, patching, expanding and reinforcing. I 
further found that mechanisms of patching, expanding and reinforcing are closely 
related to the emergence of hybrid drive within the community of electric vehicle 
researchers. 
 
3. 2. Institutional Logics and Evolution of Electric/Hybrid Drives 
3. 2. 1. Environmental Logic and Industrial Logic 
Since the Industrial Revolution, an industrial logic has long dominated 
industrial society. Actors believe that economic growth can provide jobs, 
entrepreneurial opportunities and economic wealth for the society (Hays 1995). A 
series of relevant technological innovations resulted in the invention of new machines 
and the development of sophisticated mass production systems which replaced the 
dependence of labor on humans and animals. Continuous technological improvements 




turn required exploiting more natural resources. Industrialization resulted in the 
pollution of air, soil and water. In her classic book, Silent Spring, Rachel Carson 
(1962) describes how these industrial processes damaged environments in the 1950s 
and suggests demands for ecologically sustainable economic growth. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, agendas of social movements, rooted in political 
liberalism, revolved around income inequality, gender/race discrimination and civil 
rights (Isserman and Kazin 2004). As environmental pollution increasingly became a 
critical social issue, environmental protection was incorporated into the agenda of 
1960s social movements (Gottlieb 2005; Pepper 1996). These actors sought to protect 
air, water, soil and wetlands from pollution and economic development, promote 
recycling, and support alternative energy. Grassroots environmental movements 
facilitated the expansion of social movement organizations supporting environmental 
protection (Pepper 1996).  
Gradually, these environmental movements stimulated an environmental logic 
highlighting the preservation of natural environments and the co-prosperity of 
humans and non-humans. Since the Industrial Revolution, an industrial logic has 
prevailed that regards technological innovation as positive economic and social 
progress (Shrivastava 1994). However, the emergence of an environmental logic has 
changed actors’ attitudes toward technology. Actors had begun to pay attention to the 
negative impact of technology and industrialization. These countermoves resulted in 
political successes such as passage of the Clean Air Act and creation of the 
Environmental Protection Agency in the 1970s. Environmental regulations include 




safety, and human health, all of which brought about a new agenda of ecologically 
sustainable economic development. An increase in environmental awareness 
throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s widely influenced technological fields where 
scientists, engineers and technical policymakers had begun to turn their attention to 
the relationship between technology and society. 
 
3. 2. 2. Evolution of Electric and Hybrid Drive 
In response to environmental movements, technologists revisited alternative 
fuel vehicles, including electric vehicles, from which they could dramatically cut 
hazardous emissions. In the 1880s, multiple automotive technologies such as 
gasoline-based (internal combustion) and steam-based (external combustion) engines 
and electric motor-based vehicles were introduced and competed with one another 
(Hoffman 1967; Kirsch 2000; Mom 2004). The original idea of hybrid vehicles 
combining the internal combustion-engine with an electric motor to improve vehicle 
performance was also introduced in the United States in 1905 when American 
engineer Henri Pieper filed for a patent.8 Several hybrid vehicles, such as a Woods 
Dual-Power gasoline and electric model, were produced and commercially available 
in the Unites States in the early 1900s. 
By the end of the First World War, gasoline-based internal combustion engine 
cars had become a dominant design (see Kirsch 2000 for the detailed historical 
discussion). Relatedly, an industrial logic representing techno-economic efficiency 
and efficient use of natural resources came to dominate the community of automotive 
                                                 
8 In 1901, Ferdinand Porsche first introduced Lohner-Porsche Mixte Hybrid, a 4WD series-hybrid 





technologists, which strongly supported gasoline-based internal combustion engine 
cars.  
Social movements in the 1960s increased regulatory pressure and led electric 
scientists, engineers, industrial professionals and technical policymakers as well as 
environmental groups to again turn their attention to electric vehicles. As a part of 
these efforts, a group of electric scientists, engineers and technical policymakers 
founded an electric vehicle forum, called the International Electric Vehicle 
Symposium (EVS), in 1969. 
When the symposium was first formed, scientists and technologists were 
optimistic about the future of electric vehicles, partly because environmental activists 
and some policymakers strongly supported electric vehicles, and partly because 
electric engineers were confident about improving battery performance, which had 
long been a critical issue for the performance of electric vehicles (Wouk 1986). The 
following excerpts from the EVS proceedings in 1971 aptly illustrate technologists’ 
optimism about electric vehicles in the early 1970s. 
 
When the president of a major oil company predicts, as the president 
of Shell Oil Company predicted about a month ago, that there will be 
five million electric cars in operation in this country in 1985, you 
know that progress has been made. (Lucking 1971, p 5)  
 
“[We] might expect by 1985 something like 25 to 30 million vehicles 
capable of electric propulsion at least when cruising on guideways. 
And the growth in all-electric vehicles would be less impeded by on-
board energy storage limitations. (Weldon 1971, p. 14)  
 
… The performance of the electric cars which will have to replace 




cars of the 1970’s. An [electric] car in 1970, could reach 60 mph and 
had a range of 70 miles. … an [electric] car with a performance 
near to that of a gasoline-driven car has already been achieved. 
(Bockris 1971, p. 18)  
 
 
While the creation of the EVS was partly motivated by the goal of 
environmental protection, an environmental logic was not clearly accepted as an 
“institutional logic” within this technology community in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
primary concern of electric scientists was whether the electric vehicle was a viable 
alternative to gasoline-based internal combustion vehicles. The electric scientists 
believed that if they could improve battery power and motor speed, electric vehicles 
would soon replace internal combustion engine vehicles. Therefore, in 1969 most 
discussions centered on the technical performance of electric vehicles. In other words, 
technical discussions still revolved around an industrial logic, neglecting an 
environmental logic. Over the course of 40 years after the creation of the EVS, the 
ebb and flow of social movements systematically influenced technologists’ 
incorporation of an environmental logic. Scientists and engineers had begun to 
provide their own interpretations of an environmental logic, by clarifying and 
elaborating the concepts of the environmental logic within the technological 
community. This social dynamic has deeply influenced the technical discourse 
associated with different types of vehicles. 
Figure 5 presents a total number of papers, topics of which are either pure 
electric or hybrid vehicles in 1969 and in 1994. It shows that while only one paper 
discussed hybrid vehicles in 1969, 28 papers covered hybrid vehicles in 1994.  




In Chapter 2 I argued that an institutional logic is one of the critical 
antecedents determining the emergence and decline of electric and hybrid drives. 
Further, I empirically demonstrated that the emergence of hybrid vehicles is an 
outcome of the dominance of an industrial logic. The results indicate that while an 
environmental logic firmly buttressed pure electric vehicles, an industrial logic 
strongly supported the emergence of hybrid vehicles. 
Empirical evidence in Chapter 2 notwithstanding, we must still explain how 
technologists mobilize the meanings of environmental and industrial logics. How did 
an environmental logic not become a dominant logic, thereby providing potential for 
the emergence of hybrid vehicles? How did an industrial logic become a dominant 
logic and strongly support the emergence of hybrid drive? The underlying assumption 
throughout the studies in this dissertation is that an institutional logic is neither stable 
nor enduring. It is plausible that although an institutional logic does exist over time, 
actors’ interpretations of its meaning may change over time (c.f., Carlson 1994). 
Thus, it is important to understand how the subtle nuances of meanings of 
institutional logics change over time, in order to better understand the social 
dynamics of institutional and technological change. 
 
3. 3. Method 
Since I need to trace temporal semantic changes in the conceptual elements of 
institutional logics in the technology field, I employ keyword-based, computer-aided 
text analysis. A number of researchers have used this method to calculate the distance 




The underlying assumption of this analysis is that social conflicts in institutional 
logics pertaining to technology trigger actors’ discourse and that discourse is often 
manifested in the form of texts (Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy 2004). Thus, textual 
analysis has been used as an instrument to capture temporal changes in the meanings 
of institutional logics. I shall discuss the data and method in greater detail in the 
following sections. 
 
3. 3. 1. Data 
The technological community has been recognized as an important source of 
innovation, and research proceedings have thus been employed to understand the 
origins of technology development by a number of scholars (e.g., Fleming and 
Waguespack 2007; Lampel and Meyer 2008). I specifically focus on the electric 
vehicle conference EVS. Motivated by environmental movements and increasingly 
stringent emission policies, a group of scientists and engineers, policymakers and 
industry professionals needed to organize a forum where scientists, engineers, 
industry professionals and government could share technical information associated 
with electric motor technology.  
As a result, the first EVS was held in Phoenix, Arizona in 1969. As of 2011, 
this symposium continues to expand globally and plays a critical role in introducing 
state-of-the-art technologies associated with electric-based transportation into markets 
worldwide. The EVS takes place biennially (yearly since 1996) and publishes 
research proceedings. As of 2009, 24 EVS proceedings have been published. Each 




origin, board of directors, organizing committees, and sponsors. I analyze the 
research proceedings published by the EVS in 1969 and in 1994 for the following 
reasons. 
First, I chose this electric vehicle conference over other automobile 
conferences as a primary empirical setting because one of the goals of electric vehicle 
conferences is to introduce environmentally friendly vehicles. Therefore, it would be 
more instrumental to trace contestation between environmental and industrial logics 
in the electric vehicle community than in the setting of the traditional international 
combustion engine community where an industrial logic may primarily dominate.  
Second, out of several local electric vehicle conferences, I select the EVS 
because this conference is one of the well-established and legitimate conferences 
among electric vehicles researchers. Moreover, unlike other regional conferences, the 
EVS is an international conference. Conference participants consist of engineers, 
scientists, industries and policymakers from various countries. Thus, technology, 
technical policy and environmental discussions are not limited to regional social, 
political and economic issues. Rather, they tend to cover global technical trends, 
country-level technological and policy implications, and global environmental issues. 
In the EVS, scientists, engineers, industry professionals and policymakers collectively 
introduce new concepts of electric automotive technology, and they develop shared 
understandings of various technologies, such as electric and hybrid drives, auxiliary 





Finally, out of 24 volumes of proceedings, I selected two proceedings 
published by the EVS in 1969 and in 1994. The research proceedings in 1969 allow 
me to capture the initial conceptual map of environmental and industrial logics. In 
particular, it helps to gain an understanding of the initial interpretations of each 
institutional logic developed throughout the course of the 1960s.  
Since the 1969 EVS proceedings, global economies experienced two oil crises 
in the 1970s, which created increasing demand for alternative fuel vehicles, including 
purely electric vehicles. However, during this period, industry associations and labor 
unions raised their voices, criticizing environmental idealism. An industrial logic, the 
primary concerns of which are techno-economic efficiency and economic costs, drew 
attention to technologists and consumers. Ironically, these counter-movements 
suppressed actors’ incorporation of an environmental logic, which hindered further 
development of electric vehicles.  
Automakers lobbied for weakening stringent emission policies, despite strong 
opposition from environmental groups. While lobbying for postponing emission 
standards, automakers dramatically improved fuel efficiency of their internal 
combustion engine vehicles in order to meet the new emissions standards. As a result, 
automakers improved average fuel efficiency from 14 mpg to 22 mpg in 1981 
(Anderson and Anderson 2010). These countermoves together stalled the further 
progress of electric vehicles in the 1980s.  
In 1993 the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles (PNGV) initiated 
by the Clinton administration facilitated the development of electric and hybrid 




Council for Automotive Research (USCAR), the Department of Energy, and other 
governmental agencies participated in this program. With the support of the PNGV, 
GM introduced its first purely electric vehicle, EV1 in 1996, followed by Ford Th!nk 
in 1999. However, both EV1 and Th!nk were completely discontinued in 2002 in the 
US markets. Unlike US automakers, Japanese automakers first introduced hybrid 
vehicles. Toyota launched its first hybrid vehicle, Prius using both internal 
combustion engine and electric motors in Japan in 1997, followed by the Honda 
Insight in 1999.  
In order to account for the effects of the PNGV and commercial success or 
failure of electric and hybrid vehicles in the technology community, I selected 
research proceedings published in 1994. According to the interviews with conference 
participants, on average, it took two years for authors to submit their research papers 
to the EVS after they embarked on research projects. Thus, the 1994 proceedings tend 
to reflect technical and institutional contexts prior to the year 1992. Therefore, the 
selection of the 1994 proceedings can help to control for the potential effects of 
public programs or commercialization efforts in the 1990s, while still substantially 
encapsulating the temporal changes in technologists’ responses to environmental and 
industrial logics. 
 
3. 3. 2. Analysis 
In order to trace changes in meanings associated with environmental and 
industrial logics, I employ a keyword-based, computer-aided text analysis. Because I 




impossible. Employing computer-aided text analysis (CATA) allows for processing 
such large volumes of data. Additionally, the use of CATA helps reduce coding errors, 
in comparison with human coding, and eventually increases reliability (Kabanoff 
1997; Krippendorff 2004).  
I first develop a coding framework which consists of keywords or basic 
concepts associated with environmental and industrial logics (c.f., Abrahamson and 
Eisenman 2008; Abrahamson and Fairchild 1999). The environmental logic includes 
environmental issues such as pollution and environmental impacts. The concept of 
pollution represents the level of air and noise pollution which resulted from the 
internal combustion engine, as well as hybrid and pure electric vehicles. The concept 
of environmental impacts captures how much the use of a certain vehicle improves or 
pollutes the environment. Keywords for pollution are “air pollution”, “noise 
pollution”, “air quality”, etc. Environmental impacts include “environmental 
benefits”, “air quality improvement”, “emission level”, etc. 
In contrast, the industrial logic includes the concepts of technical performance, 
economic benefits and costs, market strategies, infrastructure, and policy (see Table 3 
for a detailed coding framework). The concept of technical performance reflects 
economic efficiency and the technical instrumentality of technologies. The concept of 
economic benefits and costs refers to benefits and costs of producing and purchasing 
electric and hybrid vehicles. Market strategies represent commercialization efforts 
and creation of markets for electric and hybrid vehicles. Infrastructure refers to 




concept of policy refers to governmental policy and regulations associated with 
electricity and hybrid drives.  
For example, keywords capturing the concept of technical performance 
include “power”, “speed”, “driving range”, “energy efficiency” and “time”. 
Keywords for economic benefits and costs include “revenue”, “profit”, “cost”, etc. 
Examples of market strategies consist of “commercialization”, “consumer needs”, or 
“market demand”. Keywords representing infrastructure are “road system”, “battery 
charging facility”, etc. Examples of keywords associated with policy are “legal 
requirements” and “traffic-related regulations”.  
Based on this coding framework, I categorize research papers into two groups: 
environmental logic and industrial logic. Once I categorize research papers into two 
institutional logics, I calculate the frequency of keywords from the two groups of 
institutional logics in each year, following the procedure used by Wade, Porac, and 
Pollock (1997). The frequency of the keywords in each time period represents the 
prevalence of concepts of institutional logics in a given year (Kennedy 2008; Zelner, 
Henisz, and Holburn 2009). This process allows me to trace temporal changes in 
technologists’ interpretations of both institutional logics. 
Based on the keywords identified, I trace all the sentences which contain those 
keywords. For example, if a sentence contains the word “speed”, I code the sentence 
“speed”. If one sentence contains multiple keywords, I put multiple codes into the 
sentence. I then calculate co-occurrence of codes in the same paragraph, using 




                                    
where p = number of paragraphs where both codes i and j occur 
q = number of paragraphs where code i occurs but code j does not occur 
r = number of paragraphs where code i does not occur but code j occurs. 
 
The underlying idea of this measure of similarity is that if two codes co-occur 
in the same paragraph, the concepts of the two codes are more semantically similar to 
each other than to those occurring in other paragraphs. From the Jaccard’s similarity 
measures, I conducted a cluster analysis and finally created MDS (Multi-Dimensional 
Scale) maps which capture temporal changes in institutional logics. 
 
3. 4. Results 
Table 10 presents the summary of keywords, frequency and frequency ratios 
in 1969 and in 1994. In 1969 a total of 54 research papers was published. Utilizing 
the coding framework (see Table 3), I categorize the 54 published papers into two 
groups: environmental logic and industrial logic. Out of 54 papers, 53 papers 
discussed concepts associated with an industrial logic; and 16 papers incorporated the 
environmental logic. A total of 15 papers incorporated both logics (= 53 + 16 - 54). In 
addition to the author’s categorization, two additional research assistants 
independently categorized the 54 research papers. Krippendorff’s alpha across three 




exceeding the threshold of 0.68 set forth in Krippendorff (2004) and Neuendorf 
(2002).  
*** Insert Table 10 about here *** 
From the 53 papers having incorporated an industrial logic, I calculated the 
frequency of words. A total of 133,292 words were extracted. Out of the words, I 
excluded general words (i.e. “a”, “the”, “and”, “but”, “above”, etc.) and technical 
jargon. I also excluded keywords below the level of the .10% frequency ratio. 13 
keywords are identified. Keywords consist of technical performance such as “power”, 
“speed”, “range” and “efficiency”, economic issues such as “cost” and “economic”, 
and a market issue “market”. 
Similarly, I calculated the frequency of words from the 16 papers having 
incorporated the environmental logic. A total of 56,681 words were extracted. After 
excluding general words, technical jargon and words below the level of .10% 
frequency ratio, I was left with six frequently used keywords including “air”, 
“people”, “pollution”, “land”, “travel”, and “trip”.  
In 1994, a total of 172 papers were published. Out of 172 papers, 153 papers 
are grouped as an industrial logic; and 63 papers as an environmental logic. Among 
the papers, 44 have incorporated both logics (= 153 + 63 – 172). Again, two 
additional research assistants independently coded the papers, based on the coding 
framework (see Table 3). Krippendorff’s alphas across coders for environmental logic 
and for industrial logic were .88 and .74 respectively, again exceeding the .68 
threshold (Krippendorff 2004; Neuendorf 2002). I used similar exclusion criteria, 




the industrial logic and four keywords (i.e., “ emission”, “safety”, “air” and 
“environment”) for the environmental logic.  
Tables 11 and 12 present the co-occurrence similarity matrix using Jaccard’s 
coefficients in 1969 and in 1994 respectively. A higher score indicates that two words 
co-occur within the same paragraphs more often, suggesting that the two words are 
conceptually related. For example, a similarity score between “air” and “pollution” 
is .24 whereas a similarity score between “air” and “efficiency” is .01. This implies 
that “air” and “pollution” are semantically closer than “air” and “efficiency”. The 
similarity measures thus effectively distinguish between environmental and industrial 
logics because the words “air” and “pollution” represent an environmental logic; 
whereas the word “efficiency” reflects an industrial logic. 
*** Insert Table 11 about here *** 
*** Insert Table 12 about here *** 
Based on these similarity measures, I conducted a cluster analysis. Figures 6 
and 7 present the results of the cluster analysis in 1969 and in 1994, respectively. As 
shown in Figure 6, the environmental logic consists of six concepts: “air”, “pollution”, 
“land”, “people”, “trip”, “demand” and “travel” in 1969.  
The industrial logic contains ten basic concepts: “battery”, “power”, speed”, 
“performance”, “range”, “control”, “charging”, time”, “efficiency”, “cost” and 
“economic”, all of which cover both technical and economic issues. However, the 
concept “market” was not grouped into either an environmental logic or an industrial 




Figure 7 shows the results of a cluster analysis in 1994. In 1994 the 
environmental logic now consists of “air”, “emission” and “environment”. The 
industrial logic has both technical and economic concepts. Compared to the industrial 
logic in 1969, it appears that new concepts such as “consumer”, “infrastructure” and 
“utility” were added to an industrial logic in 1994. A new concept “safety” was not 
grouped into either an environmental logic or an industrial logic. However, the 
concept “market” is now grouped into both environmental and industrial logics. 
*** Insert Figure 6 about here *** 
*** Insert Figure 7 about here *** 
 
3. 4. 1. Logic Clarifying 
In considering temporal changes in an environmental logic from 1969 to 1994, 
it appears that the evolution of the environmental logic during this period mostly 
centers on clarifying the concept of an environmental logic; hence, I identify a 
clarifying mechanism. While discussing air pollution in 1969, most authors who 
incorporated an initial environmental logic discussed more generic social issues such 
as “people”, “land”, “travel” and “trip” (see Table 10). In the wake of environmental 
movements and a series of pollution events in the 1960s, technologists incorporated 
general social and environmental issues, and discussed them in the technological 
community. However it appears that technologists did not have a clear understanding 
of what an environmental logic is and what it means to technology. The results of 
MDS shown in Figure 8 also indicate that concepts that make up an environmental 




which represents an industrial logic appears to be discussed in terms of an 
environmental logic. The following are some excerpts from the papers incorporating 
an environmental logic. Most environmental issues revolve around efficient use of 
land, general environments, societal issues and air pollution, all of which relate to 
general and broad environmental and social issues. However, the environmental logic 
is not tightly linked to technology issues:  
 
Urban sprawl is eating away at our priceless land, air and water 
resources in the outlying areas at a truly alarming rate…. We can stop 
re enforcing the disequilibrium between land development and 
transportation modes which is built into our present way of doing 
things…. In achieving a better fit between transportation mode and 
land use, electric vehicles are potentially more ubiquitous than today's 
transport. 
 
Now we must reevaluate the benefits that accrue if we directly relate 
the transporting of people to their environment, to their working 
conditions, living conditions, recreational facilities, educational 
facilities, and so on. 
 
This system, linked to the other transportation system components 
rapid transit for travel in metropolitan areas and medium distance high 
speed corridor trains for intercity travel provides city planners with 
the means for moving more travelers, faster, and with ever greater 
convenience…The high strength pylons occupy minimal ground space 
and permit the vehicle to travel safely above existing highway and 
pedestrian traffic. … 
 
Nuclear plants although not troublesome on the score of air pollution, 
are a greater pollution problem, since for a given capacity the nuclear 
plant discharges twice as much heat to the cooling water as a fossil 
fueled plant. … 
 
In recent years there has been a growing belief that as the liquid fuel 
demand of the United States inexorably increases, the domestic 
petroleum industry will begin to fall behind in its capacity to satisfy 
that demand, despite continued special tax benefits and protection 






In contrast, as shown in Figure 9, the concepts of an environmental logic in 
1994 include emissions, air pollution, and environments. Compared to those in 1969, 
the concepts in 1994 are less ambiguous and more directly related to environment-
specific issues associated with automotive technology. The following are some 
excerpts from the papers incorporating an environmental logic. These examples well 
demonstrate that concepts of an environmental logic are now clearer and more tightly 
related to the specific technology issues in 1994: 
 
In considering air pollution reduction as well as the effective 
utilization of petroleum resources, we at Honda have always 
taken an active approach to decreasing emissions and 
increasing fuel efficiency, as our developments of stratified 
charge combustion (CVCC) and variable valve timing (VTEC) 
demonstrate. . . . 
 
The public discussion in Europe requires not only vehicles with 
zero emissions at the vehicles operation location, but the global 
emissions have to be at least equal to conventional cars with 
internal combustion engines (ICE). The most important point 
in the discussion is the primary energy consumption with its 
correlation to CO2 emissions. . . . 
 
…The most important first reason of electric vehicle choosers 
(38%), was the environmental benefits. For the second reason 
of electric vehicle choosers, flexibility of recharging and EVs 
are the car of the future tied (18%), followed by 
environmental benefits (15%). . . . 
 
 
These results together imply that actors, faced with a new institutional logic, 
initially seek to interpret the true meaning of the institutional logic and elaborate the 




understandings of a new institutional logic—environmental logic—through the 
mechanism of clarifying. 
*** Insert Figure 8 about here *** 
*** Insert Figure 9 about here *** 
 
3. 4. 2. Logic Patching 
Faced with multiple and competing logics, actors often incorporate both 
logics—a patching mechanism. Glynn and Lounsbury (2005) found this patching 
mechanism in their study of the Atlanta Symphony Orchestra. An economic crisis 
forces critics of orchestra performance to incorporate a more commercially-oriented 
market logic. Because an aesthetic logic had long influenced this profession, critics 
strategically incorporated some of the elements of a market logic into the aesthetic 
logic without completely abandoning the traditional aesthetic logic. 
Similarly, it appears that this patching mechanism has taken place in the 
electric vehicle profession. Figure 8 shows that concepts between environmental and 
industrial logics are not connected with each other, suggesting that both logics were 
conceptually independent in 1969. However, as shown in Figure 9, the concepts of 
both logics substantially co-occur in the same paragraph in 1994. This indicates that 
technologists gradually incorporate both logics simultaneously when they discuss 
technologies. Here are some examples from 1994: 
 
…Improved efficiency to reduce costs and environmental impact are 






The transit bus demonstrates that a Ballard PEM Fuel Cell Engine can 
provide the same performance as a diesel engine while meeting the 
requirements for zero emissions mandated by the California Air 
Resources Board. … 
 
 
The market for environmentally-clean power generation is growing 
as a result of increasing public support for protecting the environment 
and addressing health concerns caused by conventional means of 
generating power. … 
 
 
3. 4. 3. Logic Expanding 
Another mechanism I found is expanding. Conceptually and historically, an 
industrial logic includes technical, economic and market issues. It appears that 
technical performance, such as technical power, speed and costs were critical issues 
in an industrial logic in 1969. Further, a market concept was not linked to any of 
technical and economic concepts. Considering the MDS maps in 1969, it appears that 
an industrial logic does not embrace a market concept. Here are some excerpts from 
the papers incorporating an industrial logic in 1969: 
…Because of our interest in going at high speeds over long distances 
on nonstop throughways, we have been giving most of our attention to 
development of high energy density batteries which will make it 
possible for electric cars to duplicate the performance of the cars we 
can buy from Detroit today. … 
 
While collection of power from the wayside would preferable, it is not 
at all clear that means can be developed for the quantities of power 
needed at speeds of 200 mph or above. … 
 
The street car has disappeared   however there is a significant market 
in metropolitan areas for a transportation system which includes bus 
service supplementing commuter railroads and rapid transit routes. 
…This market consists largely of the 8 A.M. to 5 P.M. five day a 







In contrast, while technical issues are still important, charging infrastructure 
and battery performance become more important in 1994. The terms “consumer”, 
“infrastructure” and “utility” were newly created as market concepts in 1994. More 
interestingly, technical, economic and market concepts now become tightly linked to 
one another in 1994. This result shows that an industrial logic gradually expands into 
market and economic issues. Some examples are as follows: 
 
…It confirmed that the infrastructure costs to support on-board 
charging are much lower than those of off-board charging and it was 
concluded that on-board fast charging could enable an EV market. … 
 
…Customers will need to be comfortable about buying EV's, not only 
from the standpoint of reliability and safety, but also in terms of 
convenience and cost (e.g., the ability to recharge an EV's away from 
home, to easily get EV's repaired, battery life and cost and the ability 
to obtain reasonably priced maintenance and repairs.). … 
 
…The provision of 25 kVA charge points, therefore, could be more 
attractive to install than dedicated 7.4 kVA charge points, since the 
higher rates would provide more utility for EV owners and the charge 
points would also be able to support those EVs requiring 7.4 kVA 
charge rates. … 
 
 
3. 4. 4. Logic Reinforcing 
A final mechanism of logic framing is reinforcing. In Figures 8 and 9, a line 
across key concepts represents a total number of paragraphs where the two concepts 
co-occur. A thicker line means that two concepts co-occur more often in the same 




one another in both institutional logics over time. That is, three concepts in an 
environmental logic are more tightly connected with one another, thereby developing 
its unique identity as an institutional logic in 1996. Moreover, within an industrial 
logic, technical, economic and market concepts become tightly linked together from 
1969 to 1994. 
The results together indicate that both institutional logics become less 
ambiguous and more tightly linked together over time. Actors with different interests 
mobilize different interpretations of institutional logics and gradually develop shared 
understandings of institutional logics associated with technologies.  
 
3. 4. 5. Logic Formation and Evolution of Hybrid Drive 
Results show that actors incorporating an environmental logic initially 
struggled with clarifying its meanings. Its concepts were not as clear as those relating 
to industrial logic in 1969. Moreover, the conceptual elements of environmental logic 
were loosely connected with one another in 1969. Furthermore, while incorporating 
some elements of industrial logic, the environmental logic tends to generally isolate 
itself within its conceptual boundary.  
In contrast, actors within the boundary of an industrial logic, while continuing 
to reinforce its meanings of technical efficiency and economic costs/benefits, actively 
expand into a new conceptual dimension, by incorporating a market concept. The 
findings show how an industrial logic becomes a dominant logic over time.  
The results together imply that mechanisms of patching, expanding and 




environmental logic, which supports pure electric drive, is still at the stage of 
clarifying. The findings in this chapter are consistent with, and complement, those in 
Chapter 2. 
 
3. 5. Discussion 
In this chapter I have sought to understand how institutional logics evolve 
over time and how different formation of institutional logics shape the emergence and 
decline of new technologies. The prevailing literature on institutional logics tends to 
still revolve around how institutional logics shape actors’ cognition and behaviors. In 
this study, assuming that institutional logics are endogenous, I focus on how actors 
can collectively shape institutional logics by mobilizing different interpretations of 
institutional logics. I analyze research proceedings published by EVS. From the 
keyword-based, computer-aided text analysis, I found four mechanisms of framing 
institutional logics—clarifying, patching, expanding and reinforcing. Moreover, the 
results imply that the different evolution of environmental and industrial logics is 
closely related to the emergence and decline of electric and hybrid drives, which 
enriches the findings in Chapter 2. 
This study has several theoretical and practical implications. First, this study 
sheds light on theoretical debates on institutional change. A fundamental question that 
has been debated is how embedded actors whose activities tend to be constrained by 
broader institutional forces can promote institutional change. Although previous 
studies on institutional change have proclaimed that external shocks, internal 




as sources of institutional change (e.g., Barley and Tolbert 1997; Oliver 1992; Seo 
and Creed 2002; Tolbert and Zucker 1983), we still know relatively little about how 
actors respond to competing institutional logics or institutional contradictions, and 
how different formations of institutional logics systematically influence the process of 
institutional change.  
While recent institutional research has underscored the role of collective 
actions in institutional change, much of it is limited to theoretical discussion (e.g., 
Fligstein and McAdam 2011; Hargrave and Van de Ven 2006; Reay and Hinings 
2009). In this study I have attempted to address this issue, suggesting that actors 
collectively and purposefully construct institutional logics by mobilizing their 
meanings; and that this social process systematically influences the differential 
evolution of new technologies. That is, institutional logics can be enablers and 
disablers of institutional change, depending on the process of logic construction by 
actors.  
In particular, in the high-technology industry where the technology life cycle 
is much shorter, almost every day, social actors encounter new technologies and need 
to interpret the meanings of new technologies from their own institutional logics. 
Even within the technology field, scientists and engineers discuss new concepts and 
technologies during the experimental and developmental stage of new technologies. 
Technological consensus results from logic contestation. It may be almost impossible 
to assume that an institutional logic is stable and enduring, at least in the context of 
technological evolution. A certain institutional logic would help actors understand the 




other technologies that may have different institutional logics. It is therefore 
important to understand the temporal variations of institutional logics. The results in 
this study will help in better understanding the institutional process of collective 
actions, which serves as a primary source of institutional change.  
Second, this study attempts to bridge structural and agency-based perspectives, 
in that it explores interactive processes between actors and institutional logics. Based 
on the critique of technological determinism, scholars highlight human agents’ skills 
and capabilities of disrupting prevailing meaning systems, values, and norms within 
the institutional field (e.g., Barley and Tolbert 1997; Orlikowski 1992; Purdy and 
Gray 2009). Although current agency-based studies on technology have contributed 
to the development of a structurational model of technology, most studies tend to treat 
technology as a given. With this assumption, they then explore social processes 
through which social actors generate different meanings of new technology and 
subsequently develop different social structure, order, and roles (i.e., Barley 1987).  
Less is known regarding the social and cultural processes influencing the 
origin or development of new technology. In this study I empirically demonstrate 
how institutional logics mediate between actors and the emergence of technologies. 
Institutional logics in the technology context are manifestations of social actors’ 
interpretations of practices associated with technology. In other words, they are social 
and cultural outcomes resulting from actors’ interpretations of new technology. 
However, established institutional logics at the same time can constrain actors’ 




better understanding the reciprocity between actors and institutional logics, 
particularly in the context of technological evolution.  
The findings propose four potential mechanisms of framing institutional 
logics, such that social actors collectively develop institutional logics and share them 
within a community (clarifying); that the discrepancy among competing logics create 
social conflicts and lead to the hybridization of the competing logics (patching); that 
an institutional logic expands into a new conceptual dimension, thereby embracing 
new actors and technologies (expanding); and that the established institutional logics 
guide social actors’ cognitive thought-processing (reinforcing). 
Third, this study attempts to open up the “black box” of endogenous social 
and cultural processes of technological evolution that have been relatively overlooked 
in current technology, entrepreneurship and institutional studies. Although early 
research on the history of economic development has long argued that research and 
development in universities, scientific laboratories, and industries is one of the major 
sources of new knowledge, and has emphasized that it is thus necessary to explore the 
endogenous process of technological development (e.g., Rosenberg 1982; 2000; 
Tripsas 1997), we still know relatively little about the social and cultural process 
influencing the origin, development, and consequences of scientific knowledge 
(Tushman and Rosenkopf 1992). 
In particular, it is relatively understudied how social actors collectively 
interpret new technology or knowledge, and how the institutions or actors’ collective 
mindsets of technology restrict the actors’ interpretations of the technology, all of 




of technology development. The identification of social mechanisms shaping the 
emergence and decline of new technologies thus helps us to better understand the 
social aspects of technological evolution and partly addresses why a certain 
technology, despite its technological superiority, is not accepted in the technology 
field and soon disappears in the society. 
In addition to the theoretical contributions, identification of four different 
mechanisms of the evolution of institutional logics provides some strategic 
implications for entrepreneurs. To be successful entrepreneurs, technology inventors 
should develop appropriate strategies of communicating with relevant social actors 
(Hallen and Eisenhardt 2011; Hargadon and Douglas 2001; Fligstein and McAdam 
2011). The results show that entrepreneurs or managers should pay more attention to 
managing actors’ institutional logics. Conflicts in institutional logics take place across 
technological and sociocultural fields. Thus, the alignment of institutional logics 
across all relevant social actors—such as scientists, engineers, industry professionals, 
policymakers and technology users—is crucial for a successful launching of a new 
technology.  
When introducing new technology or entering new markets, entrepreneurs 
may have to choose an appropriate strategy of delivering relevant logics, associated 
with new technology, products and services, or shaping the existing logics of social 
actors. Four mechanisms discussed in this study can serve as basic guidelines for the 
entry strategies of entrepreneurs. Thus, identification of evolutionary mechanisms of 
institutional logics helps entrepreneurs develop appropriate strategies for the 




In this study I have attempted to understand the linkages among actors, 
institutional logics and technologies. I have found four framing mechanisms of 
institutional logics, which will help in better understanding the complex social 
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  · Policymakers 
 
- Technological logics 
  · Technological rationality 
  · Infrastructure 
 
- Communication means 
  · Professional meetings 
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- Social group 
  · Users of technology 
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- Market logics 
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Table 1. Industrial Logic vs. Environmental Logic 
 
 Institutional logics 
 Industrial logic Environmental logic 







- Market control 
- Liberalism 
- Social/legal control 
Policy 
orientation/norm 
- Economic development 
- Efficient use of resources/environments 
- Preservation of environments 
 
Value - Economic growth 
- Technological innovation 
- Social welfare 
- Health 
- Quality of life 
- Humanity 
Beliefs - Economic growth provides jobs, 
opportunities, and wealth. 
- Economic growth destroys our 
environments, which eventually 
devastates human life. 
Social movement 
organizations 
- American Iron and Steel Institute 
- Automobile Manufacturers Association 
- American Petroleum Institute 
- National Mining Association 
- Environment Protection Agency 
- Greenpeace 
- Sierra club 
Relevant issues in 
proceedings 
- Techno-economic efficiency 
- Infrastructure 
- Commercialization 
- Marketing strategy 
- Standardization 
- Environment 





















Table 2. Proceedings of International Electric Vehicle Symposium 
 
EVS_id Year Volume Data type Pages 
 Publishers/Organizers City State Country 
1 1969  Book 558 EVC† Phoenix AZ US 
2 1971  Book 789 EVC Atlantic City NJ US 
3 1974 1, 2 Book 1,393 EVC Washington DC US 
4 1976 1, 2 Book 1,894 EVC Dusseldorf   Germany 
5 1978  Book 691 EVC Philadelphia PA US 
6 1981  Book 601 EVC Baltimore MD US 
7 1984  Book 456 AVERE†† Versailles   France 
8 1986  Book 551 EEI†††, EPRI*, EVDC** Washington DC US 
9 1988  Book 982 EVA*** Canada Toronto Ontario Canada 
10 1990  Book 1,125 WEVA§, EVAAP§§ Hong Kong   China 
11 1992 1, 2, 3 Book 2,057 WEVA, AVERE Italy Florence   Italy 
12 1994 1, 2 Book 1,695 WEVA, EVAA§§§ Anaheim CA US 
13 1996 1, 2 Book 1,741 WEVA, EVAAP Osaka   Japan 
14 1997  CD 1,917 WEVA, EVAA Orlando FL US 
15 1998  CD 2,003 WEVA, AVERE Brussels   Belgium 
16 1999  CD 1,663 WEVA, EVAAP  Beijing   China 
17 2000  CD 2,034 WEVA, EVAA Montreal Quebec Canada 
18 2001  CD 2,738 WEVA, AVERE Berlin   Germany 
19 2002  CD 2,156 WEVA, EVAAP  Busan   Korea 
20 2003  CD 2,325 WEVA, EDTA§§§§ Long Beach CA US 
21 2005  CD 2,799 WEVA, AVERE Monaco   Monaco 
22 2006  CD 2,401 WEVA, EVAAP Yokohama   Japan 
23 2007  CD 2,534 WEVA, EDTA Anaheim CA US 
24 2009  CD 2,900 WEVA, AVERE Stavanger   Norway 
†: Electric Vehicle Council; ††: European Electric Road Vehicle Association; †††: Edison Electric 
Institute; *: Electric Power Research Institute; **: Electric Vehicle Development Corporation; ***: 
Electric Vehicle Association; §: World Electric Vehicle Association; §§: Electric Vehicle Association of 








Table 3. Keywords of Environmental vs. Industrial Logic  
 
Environmental Logic  Industrial Logic 
"air pollution" "low emission"  "auxiliary performance" "infrastructure - technical" 
"air quality" "low pollution"  "battery application" "infrastructure - legal" 
"battery safety" "motor noise"  "battery efficiency" "lifecycle cost" 
"clean" "noise emission"  "battery performance" "market" 
"climate change" "pollutant"  "battery power" "market analysis" 
"CO2 emission" "pollution free"  "battery price" "market strategy" 
"ecology" "pollution reduction"  "battery system performance" "market supply" 
"emission reduction" "pollution"  "charging infrastructure" "market trend" 
"emission regulation" "quality of life"  "commercialization" "marketability" 
"emission standard" "renewable"  "cost of infrastructure" "marketing" 
"emission" "safety emission"  "cost reduction" "mass production" 
"energy consumption"* "safety"  "demonstration" "modeling" 
"energy saving"* "social benefit"  "design" "optimal design" 
"environment" "social value"  "design optimization" "optimization" 
"environmental benefit" "sustainability"  "driving range" "patent policy" 
"environment friendly" "sustainable"  "economic analysis" "performance" 
"environmental impact" "zero emission"  "economic benefit" "performance - power" 
"environmental issue"   "economic development" "performance - speed" 
"environmental pollution"   "economic efficiency" "performance test" 
"environmental problem"   "economic feasibility" "power" 
"environmental protection"   "economic impact" "promotion" 
"environmental quality"   "economic issue" "public policy" 
"environmental requirement"   "economic performance" "purchasing price" 
"environmental standard"   "economic viability" "regulation" 
"fuel consumption"   "economics" "regulatory effort" 
"fuel economy"   "economy" "regulatory issue" 
"fuel efficiency"   "educational infrastructure" "simulation" 
"fuel saving"   "efficiency" "standardization" 
"gas emission"   "efficiency cost reduction" "system performance" 
"global environment"   "energy efficiency"** "technical analysis" 
"global warming"   "energy storage" "technical concern" 
"greenhouse emission"   "energy supply"*** "technical efficiency" 
"greenhouse gas emission"   "engine power" "technical feasibility" 
"greenhouse gas reduction"   "experiment" "technical performance" 
"greenhouse gas"   "infrastructure" "techno-economic issue" 
"health hazard"   "infrastructure-economic" "techno-economic assessment" 
* Keywords “energy consumption” and “energy saving” represent gasoline consumption that is directly 
related to CO2 emissions and the protection of the natural environment. 
** A keyword “energy efficiency” represents energy losses of electric systems and devices, efficiency 
of energy conversion, and maximum output of electric systems. 








Table 4. Definitions of Variables 
 
Variable Definition 
Environmental Logic (it) 1 if a paper’s topic is related to environment, pollution and ecology for 
author i at time t; 0 otherwise 
Industrial Logic (it) 1 if a paper’s topic is related to technical and economic efficiency, 
infrastructure, marketing strategy, standardization and 
commercialization for author i at time t; 0 otherwise 




Hybrid Drive (it) 1 if a paper’s topic is related to hybrid drive for author i at time t; 0 
otherwise 
Environmental Protest (t-2) Total number of environmental protest events covered by New York 
Times at time t-2 
US Unemployment (t-2) Average unemployment rate in U.S. at time t-2 
Cohesion Networks  
Environmental Logic (t-2) 
Density of co-authorship networks associated with an environmental 




Cohesion Networks Industrial 
Logic (t-2) 
Density of co-authorship networks associated with an industrial logic at 
time t-2 
Δ Environmental Logic (t-2) [Total number of authors associated with an environmental logic (t-2) – 
Total number of authors associated with an environmental logic (t-3)] / 
Total number of authors associated with an environmental logic (t-3) 
Δ Industrial Logic (t-2) [Total number of authors associated with an industrial logic (t-2) – 
Number of authors associated with an industrial logic (t-3)] / Number of 
authors associated with an industrial logic (t-3) 
Country-fixed effects (it) (Dummies) 1 if the origin of an author i’s affiliation is U.S., Canada, 
Germany, France, Italy, UK, Korea, Japan, or China; 0 otherwise 
Institution-fixed effects (it) (Dummies) 1 if an author i’s affiliation is universities (University), 
governments (Government), government-sponsored research institution 
(G-sponsored research), independent private research institutions 
(Research), or companies (Industry); 0 otherwise 
Motor type-fixed effects (it) (Dummies) 1 if an author i discusses DC motor, AC motor, induction 
motor, permanent magnet motor, or switched reluctance motor; 0 
otherwise 
Energy source-fixed effects (it) (Dummies) 1 if an author i discusses lead acid batteries, nickel-based 
batteries, lithium-based batteries, fuel cells, zinc air-based batteries, or 
capacitors/flywheels; 0 otherwise 
Δ US CO2 Emission (t-2) [Total emission of carbon dioxide in U.S. (t-2) - Total emission of carbon 
dioxide in U.S. (t-3)]/ Total emission of carbon dioxide in U.S. (t-3) 
Δ US Car Price (t-2) [Average price of domestic internal combustion engine passenger cars in 
U.S. (t-2) - Average price of domestic internal combustion engine 
passenger cars in U.S. (t-3)] / Average price of domestic internal 
combustion engine passenger cars in U.S. (t-3) 
Control 
variables 
Δ US Oil Price (t-2) [Average oil price per barrel in U.S. (t-2) - Average oil price per barrel in 





Table 5. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (N = 11421) 
 
Variable Mean SD Min Max (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
(1) Environmental Logic (it) 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 1.00            
(2) Industrial Logic (it) 0.94 0.24 0.00 1.00 -0.32 1.00           
(3) Hybrid Drive (it) 0.38 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.20 0.02 1.00          
(4) Electric Drive (it) 0.71 0.46 0.00 1.00 -0.20 -0.01 -0.81 1.00         
(5) Environmental Protest (t-2) 22.94 7.18 9.00 39.00 0.05 -0.03 0.08 -0.09 1.00        
(6) US Unemployment (t-2) (%) 5.34 1.01 4.00 9.70 -0.09 0.03 -0.21 0.17 -0.27 1.00       
(7) Cohesion Networks Environmental Logic (t-2) 19.85 15.18 10.20 88.90 -0.13 0.01 -0.22 0.19 0.05 0.48 1.00      
(8) Cohesion Networks Industrial Logic (t-2) 7.68 3.06 5.20 19.90 -0.11 0.00 -0.20 0.17 0.03 0.50 0.89 1.00     
(9) ∆ Environmental Logic (t-2) 32.35 67.51 -85.42 230.00 -0.04 -0.02 -0.17 0.14 0.19 0.31 0.30 0.44 1.00    
(10) ∆ Industrial Logic (t-2) 15.92 35.97 -24.42 109.28 -0.03 0.00 -0.12 0.10 -0.15 0.25 0.01 -0.01 0.56 1.00   
(11) US (it) 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.02 0.04 -0.03 -0.07 0.06 0.09 0.08 -0.04 0.03 1.00  
(12) Canada (it) 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.01 -0.08 1.00 
(13) Germany (it) 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 -0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.14 -0.05 
(14) France (it) 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 -0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.14 -0.05 
(15) Italy (it) 0.04 0.21 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.01 -0.11 -0.04 
(16) UK (it) 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 -0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.01 -0.01 -0.08 -0.03 
(17) Korea (it) 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.10 -0.13 0.07 -0.13 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.11 -0.04 
(18) Japan (it) 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.01 -0.08 0.05 -0.04 0.01 -0.07 -0.08 0.10 0.11 -0.28 -0.09 
(19) China (it) 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10 -0.13 -0.04 
(20) University (it) 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.08 -0.13 -0.09 -0.08 -0.11 -0.12 -0.19 -0.03 
(21) Government (it) 0.04 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.04 -0.07 -0.04 0.08 -0.04 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.10 0.07 
(22) G-sponsored Research (it) 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.03 -0.03 0.08 -0.06 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 0.13 -0.04 
(23) Private Research (it) 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 0.07 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.07 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 
(24) Industry (it) 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 -0.04 0.08 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.02 
(25) ∆ US Oil Price (t-2) 0.15 0.28 -0.48 0.77 0.05 -0.02 0.12 -0.14 0.34 -0.32 -0.20 -0.03 -0.22 -0.28 -0.06 -0.07 
(26) ∆ US Car Price (t-2) 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.11 -0.12 0.02 -0.22 0.19 -0.23 0.59 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.55 0.11 0.04 
(27) ∆ US CO2 Emission (t-2) 0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.06 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.22 -0.09 -0.13 -0.17 -0.35 0.04 0.02 -0.02 
(28) AC Motor (it) 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 
(29) DC Motor (it) 0.04 0.21 0.00 1.00 -0.04 0.05 -0.06 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.01 
(30) Induction Motor (it) 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00 -0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 
(31) Permanent Magnet Motor (it) 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 -0.10 0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.07 -0.02 
(32) Switched Reluctance Motor (it) 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00 -0.05 0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 
(33) Capacitor Flywheel (it) 0.07 0.25 0.00 1.00 -0.04 0.04 0.08 -0.10 0.03 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 
(34) Fuel Cell Battery (it) 0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.10 -0.10 -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 -0.09 0.01 0.01 
(35) Lead Acid Battery (it) 0.08 0.27 0.00 1.00 -0.13 0.06 -0.10 0.08 -0.06 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.01 
(36) Lithium-based Battery (it) 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 -0.02 0.05 0.08 -0.05 0.00 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.08 -0.05 -0.02 0.06 
(37) Nickel-based Battery (it) 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 -0.11 0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.00 
(38) ZincAir-based Battery (it) 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00 -0.04 0.03 -0.06 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.10 





Table 5. (continued) 
 
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) 
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
                         
1.00                         
-0.08 1.00                        
-0.06 -0.06 1.00                       
-0.05 -0.05 -0.04 1.00                      
-0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 1.00                     
-0.15 -0.15 -0.12 -0.09 -0.12 1.00                    
-0.07 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 -0.14 1.00                   
0.04 -0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 -0.19 0.24 1.00                  
-0.06 -0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.15 1.00                 
-0.07 0.02 0.07 -0.05 -0.03 0.01 -0.08 -0.23 -0.07 1.00                
-0.02 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 0.02 -0.19 -0.06 -0.08 1.00               
0.04 0.04 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 0.24 -0.18 -0.64 -0.19 -0.28 -0.24 1.00              
0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.12 -0.03 0.01 0.08 -0.06 0.03 0.00 -0.08 1.00             
0.00 0.06 0.03 0.03 -0.12 0.02 -0.06 -0.16 0.06 0.01 -0.04 0.16 -0.32 1.00            
-0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.21 -0.06 1.00           
-0.01 -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.00 1.00          
-0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.00 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.04 0.04 1.00         
0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.06 0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.05 -0.03 1.00        
-0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.02 1.00       
0.14 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.06 0.02 0.08 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00      
0.00 -0.01 0.05 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.04 -0.09 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 1.00     
0.02 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.07 -0.06 0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.04 0.08 -0.17 -0.04 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.09 0.01 0.05 1.00    
0.03 -0.02 0.05 0.01 -0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.03 0.04 -0.05 0.12 0.05 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.08 1.00   
-0.02 0.04 -0.06 -0.05 0.01 0.08 -0.05 -0.12 -0.01 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.04 -0.10 0.00 -0.05 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 -0.10 -0.03 1.00  
0.00 0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.07 -0.02 -0.10 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.12 -0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.07 0.12 0.02 1.00 





Table 6. Probit Regressions of Institutional Logics 
 
 DV = Industrial Logic (it) DV = Environmental Logic (it) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  β ME  β ME  β ME  β ME 
Country effects         
US (it) 0.210*** 0.021*** 0.212*** 0.021*** -0.077** -0.029** -0.079** -0.029** 
 (3.53) (3.92) (3.56) (3.96) (-1.93) (-1.95) (-1.99) (-2.01) 
Canada (it) -0.155* -0.019* -0.153* -0.019* 0.028 0.010 0.030 0.011 
 (-1.49) (-1.34) (-1.47) (-1.32) (0.35) (0.34) (0.37) (0.37) 
Germany (it) 0.182** 0.018*** 0.176** 0.017*** -0.200*** -0.072*** -0.195*** -0.071*** 
 (2.16) (2.48) (2.10) (2.39) (-3.73) (-3.89) (-3.64) (-3.78) 
France (it) 0.193*** 0.019*** 0.200*** 0.019*** -0.268*** -0.096*** -0.267*** -0.095*** 
 (2.34) (2.69) (2.43) (2.81) (-4.94) (-5.25) (-4.91) (-5.21) 
Italy (it) 0.115 0.012* 0.136* 0.014* 0.083* 0.032* 0.081 0.031 
 (1.19) (1.30) (1.42) (1.59) (1.32) (1.30) (1.27) (1.26) 
UK (it) 0.412*** 0.033*** 0.401*** 0.033*** -0.194*** -0.070*** -0.188*** -0.068*** 
 (2.81) (4.10) (2.74) (3.95) (-2.43) (-2.54) (-2.34) (-2.44) 
Korea (it) 0.254*** 0.023*** 0.272*** 0.025*** -0.150*** -0.055*** -0.163*** -0.059*** 
 (2.57) (3.14) (2.74) (3.41) (-2.42) (-2.50) (-2.62) (-2.71) 
Japan (it) 0.089* 0.010* 0.095* 0.010** -0.082** -0.031** -0.084** -0.031** 
 (1.54) (1.60) (1.64) (1.71) (-2.11) (-2.13) (-2.16) (-2.17) 
China (it) 0.649*** 0.046*** 0.668*** 0.047*** -0.235*** -0.085*** -0.242*** -0.087*** 
 (5.81) (10.23) (5.98) (10.71) (-4.20) (-4.42) (-4.32) (-4.56) 
Institution effects         
University (it) 0.308*** 0.032*** 0.310*** 0.032*** -0.099 -0.037 -0.106 -0.039 
 (2.63) (2.81) (2.65) (2.83) (-1.06) (-1.07) (-1.14) (-1.15) 
Government (it) -0.141 -0.017 -0.147 -0.018 0.257*** 0.100** 0.256*** 0.099** 
 (-1.05) (-0.95) (-1.09) (-0.99) (2.37) (2.32) (2.36) (2.31) 
G-sponsored Research (it) 0.178* 0.018* 0.171* 0.017* 0.103 0.039 0.103 0.039 
 (1.39) (1.58) (1.34) (1.50) (1.02) (1.01) (1.03) (1.01) 
Private Research (it) 0.197* 0.019** 0.208* 0.020** 0.293*** 0.114*** 0.281*** 0.109*** 
 (1.52) (1.76) (1.61) (1.88) (2.89) (2.83) (2.78) (2.72) 
Industry (it) 0.554*** 0.060*** 0.549*** 0.059*** -0.036 -0.014 -0.038 -0.014 
 (4.61) (4.68) (4.57) (4.64) (-0.39) (-0.39) (-0.40) (-0.40) 
Substitution effects         
∆ US Oil Price (t-2) -0.095 -0.011 0.016 0.002 0.072* 0.027* 0.024 0.009 
 (-1.25) (-1.25) (0.21) (0.21) (1.51) (1.51) (0.48) (0.48) 
∆ US Car Price (t-2) 0.884 0.098 -0.191 -0.021 -6.198*** -2.327*** -5.259*** -1.974*** 
 (1.23) (1.23) (-0.21) (-0.21) (-12.17) (-12.17) (-8.82) (-8.82) 
Pollution effects         
∆ US CO2 Emission (t-2) -0.459 -0.051 -1.535* -0.170* -0.832 -0.312 -0.505 -0.189 
 (-0.42) (-0.42) (-1.39) (-1.39) (-1.11) (-1.11) (-0.63) (-0.63) 
Main effects         
Environmental Protest (t-2)   -0.008*** -0.001***   0.002 0.001 
   (-2.62) (-2.63)   (1.25) (1.25) 
US Unemployment (t-2) (%)   0.048** 0.005**   -0.046*** -0.017*** 
   (1.94) (1.95)   (-2.94) (-2.94) 
Constant 1.064***  1.010***  -0.063  0.107  
 (9.16)  (5.43)  (-0.68)  (0.80)  
N 11421  11421  11421  11421  
Log Likelihood -2527.430  -2521.518  -7336.849  -7331.079  
-2ΔL   11.824***    11.540***  
*: p < .10; **: p < .05; ***: p < .01 (one-tailed test) 




Table 7. Probit Regressions of Electric and Hybrid Drives 
 
 DV = Electric Drive (it) DV = Hybrid Drive (it) 
Variable Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  β ME  β ME  β ME  β ME 
Country effects         
US (it) -0.164*** -0.056*** -0.192*** -0.064*** 0.107*** 0.041*** 0.135*** 0.051*** 
 (-3.84) (-3.74) (-4.40) (-4.26) (2.60) (2.58) (3.24) (3.20) 
Canada (it) -0.048 -0.016 -0.098 -0.032 -0.010 -0.004 0.046 0.017 
 (-0.52) (-0.51) (-1.02) (-0.99) (-0.11) (-0.11) (0.54) (0.54) 
Germany (it) -0.046 -0.015 -0.087* -0.029* 0.086* 0.033* 0.114** 0.043** 
 (-0.80) (-0.79) (-1.51) (-1.48) (1.56) (1.55) (2.08) (2.05) 
France (it) 0.065 0.021 0.024 0.008 -0.160*** -0.059*** -0.142*** -0.052*** 
 (1.11) (1.14) (0.41) (0.41) (-2.86) (-2.95) (-2.53) (-2.60) 
Italy (it) -0.134** -0.046** -0.253*** -0.087*** 0.304*** 0.118*** 0.392*** 0.153*** 
 (-1.92) (-1.86) (-3.49) (-3.30) (4.60) (4.51) (5.82) (5.71) 
UK (it) -0.399*** -0.145*** -0.467*** -0.168*** 0.291*** 0.113*** 0.335*** 0.130*** 
 (-4.79) (-4.49) (-5.41) (-5.01) (3.54) (3.47) (3.99) (3.90) 
Korea (it) -0.644*** -0.240*** -0.616*** -0.226*** 0.375*** 0.146*** 0.363*** 0.141*** 
 (-10.11) (-9.54) (-9.62) (-8.92) (5.97) (5.86) (5.78) (5.65) 
Japan (it) 0.108*** 0.035*** 0.122*** 0.038*** -0.228*** -0.084*** -0.248*** -0.090*** 
 (2.56) (2.61) (2.87) (2.94) (-5.61) (-5.78) (-6.07) (-6.27) 
China (it) 0.061 0.020 0.122** 0.038** -0.174*** -0.063*** -0.224*** -0.080*** 
 (1.00) (1.02) (2.00) (2.08) (-2.99) (-3.10) (-3.79) (-3.98) 
Institution effects         
University (it) 0.159* 0.052** 0.195** 0.061** 0.148* 0.056* 0.130 0.049 
 (1.63) (1.66) (1.92) (1.96) (1.49) (1.48) (1.27) (1.26) 
Government (it) 0.686*** 0.178*** 0.685*** 0.171*** 0.105 0.040 0.115 0.044 
 (5.58) (7.83) (5.35) (7.59) (0.90) (0.89) (0.95) (0.94) 
G-sponsored Research (it) -0.233** -0.081** -0.181** -0.061* 0.629*** 0.246*** 0.595*** 0.232*** 
 (-2.24) (-2.14) (-1.67) (-1.60) (5.93) (5.99) (5.48) (5.48) 
Private Research (it) 0.041 0.013 0.073 0.023 0.297*** 0.115*** 0.283*** 0.109*** 
 (0.39) (0.39) (0.67) (0.68) (2.76) (2.70) (2.57) (2.51) 
Industry (it) -0.039 -0.013 -0.033 -0.011 0.395*** 0.149*** 0.395*** 0.148*** 
 (-0.40) (-0.40) (-0.32) (-0.32) (3.93) (3.94) (3.82) (3.84) 
Substitution effects         
∆ US Oil Price (t-2) -0.368*** -0.122*** -0.174*** -0.056*** 0.164*** 0.062*** 0.037 0.014 
 (-6.71) (-6.71) (-2.58) (-2.57) (3.16) (3.16) (0.59) (0.59) 
∆ US Car Price (t-2) 6.118*** 2.023*** 0.023 0.007 -5.918*** -2.223*** -0.724 -0.270 
 (8.12) (8.13) (0.03) (0.03) (-8.15) (-8.16) (-0.89) (-0.89) 
Pollution effects         
∆ US CO2 Emission (t-2) 5.097*** 1.685*** 1.940* 0.624* -6.448*** -2.422*** -4.245*** -1.584*** 
 (5.51) (5.53) (1.59) (1.58) (-7.23) (-7.24) (-4.05) (-4.03) 
Technology effects - motor         
AC Motor (it) -0.118* -0.040 -0.211** -0.072** 0.076 0.029 0.163** 0.062** 
 (-1.30) (-1.26) (-2.21) (-2.10) (0.86) (0.85) (1.75) (1.72) 
DC Motor (it) 0.355*** 0.105*** 0.332*** 0.096*** -0.407*** -0.140*** -0.395*** -0.135*** 
 (5.03) (5.78) (4.58) (5.24) (-6.06) (-6.79) (-5.79) (-6.48) 
Induction Motor (it) -0.031 -0.010 -0.059 -0.019 0.017 0.006 0.028 0.010 
 (-0.39) (-0.39) (-0.73) (-0.72) (0.23) (0.23) (0.37) (0.37) 
Permanent Magnet Motor (it) 0.017 0.005 -0.010 -0.003 -0.102** -0.038** -0.087* -0.032* 
 







Table 7  (continued) 
*: p < .10; **: p < .05; ***: p < .01 (one-tailed test) 















Switched Reluctance Motor (it) 0.782*** 0.190*** 0.822*** 0.188*** -0.587*** -0.190*** -0.606*** -0.193*** 
 (5.09) (7.99) (5.29) (8.76) (-4.68) (-5.80) (-4.74) (-5.98) 
Technology effects - energy 
source 
        
Capacitor Flywheel (it) -0.492*** -0.180*** -0.471*** -0.168*** 0.339*** 0.132*** 0.317*** 0.123*** 
 (-9.93) (-9.30) (-9.34) (-8.65) (6.88) (6.75) (6.42) (6.27) 
Fuel Cell Battery (it) 0.468*** 0.137*** 0.522*** 0.145*** -0.309*** -0.111*** -0.352*** -0.124*** 
 (11.17) (13.03) (12.08) (14.66) (-7.89) (-8.39) (-8.84) (-9.55) 
Lead Acid Battery (it) 0.417*** 0.121*** 0.393*** 0.112*** -0.440*** -0.151*** -0.424*** -0.145*** 
 (7.36) (8.61) (6.88) (7.98) (-8.24) (-9.27) (-7.91) (-8.88) 
Lithium-based Battery (it) -0.039 -0.013 0.009 0.003 0.141*** 0.054*** 0.104*** 0.039*** 
 (-0.97) (-0.97) (0.23) (0.23) (3.62) (3.57) (2.68) (2.65) 
Nickel-based Battery (it) -0.185*** -0.064*** -0.187*** -0.063*** 0.113*** 0.043*** 0.105*** 0.040** 
 (-4.03) (-3.88) (-4.04) (-3.88) (2.51) (2.48) (2.34) (2.31) 
ZincAir-based Battery (it) 1.162*** 0.235*** 1.095*** 0.219*** -0.811*** -0.242*** -0.723*** -0.220*** 
 (5.55) (12.98) (4.78) (10.60) (-5.16) (-7.43) (-4.23) (-5.76) 
Institutional logic effects         
Environmental Protest (t-2) -0.012*** -0.004*** -0.027*** -0.009*** 0.009*** 0.003*** 0.020*** 0.007*** 
 (-5.39) (-5.40) (-10.10) (-10.22) (4.32) (4.32) (7.68) (7.72) 
US Unemployment (t-2) (%) 0.079*** 0.026*** 0.043** 0.014** -0.151*** -0.057*** -0.101*** -0.038*** 
 (4.39) (4.40) (2.04) (2.05) (-8.79) (-8.81) (-5.27) (-5.28) 
Δ Environmental Logic (t-2) 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.001*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.001*** 
 (10.16) (10.22) (8.01) (8.00) (-11.27) (-11.28) (-8.22) (-8.22) 
Δ Industrial Logic (t-2) -0.003*** -0.001*** 0.000 0.000 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 
 (-6.23) (-6.24) (-0.64) (-0.64) (5.13) (5.13) (-0.48) (-0.48) 
Main effects         
Cohesion Networks  
Environmental Logic (t-2) 








  -0.072*** -0.023***   0.032*** 0.012*** Cohesion Networks  
Industrial Logic (t-2)   (-4.71) (-4.77)   (2.42) (2.42) 
Constant 0.151  0.640***  0.317**  -0.064  
 (1.01)  (3.87)  (2.17)  (-0.40)  
N 11421  11421  11421  11421  
Log Likelihood -6222.816  -6077.323  -6845.017  -6730.696  




Table 8. Probit Regressions of Hybrid Drive 
(median split by COHESION NETWORKS ENVIRONMENTAL LOGIC (t-2)) 
 DV = Hybrid Drive (it) 
 
                             High  
Cohesion Networks Environmental Logic 
                              Low 
Cohesion Networks Environmental Logic 
Variable† Model 9   Model 10  
  β ME   β ME 
Country effects      
US (it) 0.148*** 0.051**  0.112** 0.044** 
 (2.37) (2.32)  (1.92) (1.91) 
Canada (it) -0.473*** -0.135***  0.554*** 0.216*** 
 (-3.52) (-4.31)  (4.20) (4.48) 
Germany (it) 0.050 0.017  0.229*** 0.091*** 
 (0.65) (0.64)  (2.76) (2.77) 
France (it) -0.229*** -0.072***  -0.006 -0.002 
 (-2.83) (-3.04)  (-0.07) (-0.07) 
Italy (it) 0.284*** 0.101***  0.809*** 0.304*** 
 (3.22) (3.06)  (7.00) (8.18) 
UK (it) 0.274*** 0.098**  0.415*** 0.164*** 
 (2.40) (2.28)  (3.48) (3.59) 
Korea (it) 0.300*** 0.108***  0.359*** 0.142*** 
 (3.23) (3.06)  (4.07) (4.14) 
Japan (it) -0.134** -0.044***  -0.330*** -0.128*** 
 (-2.29) (-2.34)  (-5.50) (-5.66) 
China (it) -0.207** -0.065**  -0.161** -0.063** 
 (-2.02) (-2.17)  (-2.17) (-2.20) 
Institution effects      
University (it) -0.156 -0.051  0.400*** 0.158*** 
 (-1.15) (-1.17)  (2.76) (2.79) 
Government (it) -0.043 -0.014  0.342** 0.136** 
 (-0.27) (-0.28)  (1.98) (2.01) 
G-sponsored Research (it) 0.269** 0.096**  0.987*** 0.364*** 
 (1.85) (1.77)  (6.38) (7.77) 
Private Research (it) -0.006 -0.002  0.552*** 0.216*** 
 (-0.04) (-0.04)  (3.58) (3.77) 
Industry (it) 0.083 0.028  0.803*** 0.312*** 
 (0.60) (0.60)  (5.48) (5.78) 
Substitution effects      
∆ US Oil Price (t-2)  0.962*** 0.323***  1.170*** 0.464*** 
 (8.01) (8.12)  (8.08) (8.08) 
Technology effects - motor      
AC Motor (it) 0.317*** 0.114***  -0.036 -0.014 
 (2.67) (2.52)  (-0.26) (-0.26) 
DC Motor (it) -0.348*** -0.105***  -0.441*** -0.166*** 
 (-3.62) (-4.13)  (-4.79) (-5.19) 
Induction Motor (it) -0.024 -0.008  0.483*** 0.190*** 
 







Table 8  (continued) 
Permanent Magnet Motor (it) 0.195*** 0.068***  -0.372*** -0.142*** 
 (2.54) (2.44)  (-4.26) (-4.52) 
Switched Reluctance Motor (it) -0.548*** -0.151***  -0.709*** -0.251*** 
 (-2.85) (-3.70)  (-4.02) (-4.92) 
Technology effects - energy source      
Capacitor Flywheel (it) 0.399*** 0.145***  0.182*** 0.072*** 
 (5.62) (5.29)  (2.59) (2.59) 
Fuel Cell Battery (it) -0.139** -0.045**  -0.637*** -0.238*** 
 (-2.22) (-2.30)  (-12.11) (-13.38) 
Lead Acid Battery (it) -0.341*** -0.104***  -0.486*** -0.182*** 
 (-5.19) (-5.79)  (-5.12) (-5.61) 
Lithium-based Battery (it) 0.001 0.000  0.059 0.023 
 (0.01) (0.01)  (1.11) (1.11) 
Nickel-based Battery (it) 0.186*** 0.065***  0.135** 0.054** 
 (3.22) (3.11)  (1.92) (1.92) 
ZincAir-based Battery (it) -0.436** -0.126***  -1.048*** -0.334*** 
 (-2.16) (-2.62)  (-4.78) (-7.35) 
Institutional logic effects      
Environmental Protest (t-2) 0.010*** 0.004***  0.122*** 0.049*** 
 (3.06) (3.07)  (8.69) (8.70) 
US Unemployment (t-2) (%) 0.082** 0.027**  -1.189*** -0.471*** 
 (2.23) (2.24)  (-9.99) (-10.00) 
Δ Environmental Logic (t-2) 0.000 0.000  0.021*** 0.008*** 
 (-1.17) (-1.17)  (6.95) (6.96) 
Δ Industrial Logic (t-2) -0.003*** -0.001***  -0.026*** -0.010*** 
 (-5.09) (-5.10)  (-6.54) (-6.54) 
Main effects      
-0.090*** -0.030***  0.807*** 0.320*** Cohesion Networks 
Industrial Logic (t-2) (-8.50) (-8.68)  (7.75) (7.75) 
      
Constant -0.635**   -2.538***  
 (-2.45)   (-5.31)  
N 6154   5267  
Log Likelihood -3342.410   -3206.226  
*: p < .10; **: p < .05; ***: p < .01 (one-tailed test) 
t-statistics in parentheses; robust standard errors used 
†: In the case of low COHESION NETWORKS ENVIRONMENTAL LOGIC (model 10), a 
specification with the variables of Δ US CAR PRICE and Δ CO2 EMISSION could not be identified 
because of multicolinearity. Thus, the two variables are excluded in both models 9 and 10 to compare 














DV = Industrial logic (it) 
Equation 2 
DV = Environmental logic (it) 
Equation 3 
DV = Electric drive (it) 
Equation 4 
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Control Variables† Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
ρ21 -0.762***        
 (-54.66)        
ρ31 0.012        
 (0.53)        
ρ41 0.055**        
 (2.28)        
ρ32 -0.317***        
 (-20.65)        
ρ42 0.279***        
 (18.30)        
ρ43 -0.984***        
 (-586.19)        
N 11421 11421 11421 11421 11421 11421 11421 11421 
*: p < .10; **: p < .05; ***: p < .01 (one-tailed test) 
t-statistics in parentheses; robust standard error used 
†: Control variables in table 6 are included in equations 1 and 2; control variables in table 7 are 
included in equations 3 and 4 







Figure 5. Total Number of Papers Covering Electric and Hybrid Drives 
 
 











Table 10. Frequency of Keywords in Institutional Logics 
 
Year 1969 (EVS 1)*  Year 1994 (EVS 12)** Institutional Logics 
Key words Freq. %  Key words Freq. % 
Industrial logic Power 608 0.50  Charging 2,464 0.60 
 Speed 514 0.40  Power 2,489 0.60 
 Cost 345 0.30  Batteries 1,392 0.30 
 Time 266 0.20  Range 995 0.20 
 Control 261 0.20  Performance 940 0.20 
 Batteries 247 0.20  Speed 814 0.20 
 Charging 183 0.20  Control 795 0.20 
 Range 172 0.10  Time 747 0.20 
 Performance 152 0.10  Cost 814 0.20 
 Efficiency 130 0.10  Efficiency 697 0.20 
 Economic 97 0.10  Consumer 360 0.10 
 Market 93 0.10  Market 299 0.10 
 Demand 83 0.10  Infrastructure 261 0.10 
Total papers  53   153   
Total word counts  133,292   399,285   
Air 113 0.20  Emissions 577 0.30 
People 77 0.10  Safety 242 0.20 
Pollution 63 0.10  Air 216 0.10 
Land 51 0.10  Environment 194 0.10 
Travel 45 0.10     
Environmental Logic 
Trip 30 0.10     
Total papers  16   63   
Total word counts  56,681   156,071   
* In 1969, 54 papers were published. When a paper covers both environmental and industrial logics, the 
paper is included when counting keywords for the environmental and industrial logics. In total 15 (= 
53 + 16 - 54) papers used both logics. 
** In 1994, 172 papers were published. Similarly, when a paper covers both environmental and 
industrial logics, the paper is included when counting keywords for the environmental and industrial 





Table 11. Similarity Matrix of Institutional Logics in 1969 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(1) Air 1.00                                   
(2) Battery 0.11 1.00                                 
(3) Charging 0.03 0.14 1.00                               
(4) Control 0.06 0.07 0.09 1.00                             
(5) Cost 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.14 1.00                           
(6) Demand 0.10 0.01 0.07 0.03 0.06 1.00                         
(7) Economic 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.11 0.04 1.00                       
(8) Efficiency 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.10 0.02 0.06 0.03 1.00                     
(9) Land 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.00 1.00                   
(10) Market 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.00 1.00                 
(11) People 0.09 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.04 1.00               
(12) Performance 0.06 0.16 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.03 1.00             
(13) Pollution 0.24 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.13 0.04 1.00           
(14) Power 0.08 0.23 0.07 0.15 0.15 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.13 0.05 1.00         
(15) Range 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.10 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.16 1.00       
(16) Speed 0.04 0.16 0.06 0.20 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.33 0.16 1.00     
(17) Time 0.07 0.07 0.14 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.07 0.11 1.00   
(18) Travel 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.05 1.00 





Table 12. Similarity Matrix of Institutional Logics in 1994 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
(1) Air 1.00                                 
(2) Batteries 0.04 1.00                               
(3) Charging 0.02 0.12 1.00                             
(4) Consumer 0.03 0.03 0.03 1.00                           
(5) Control 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.03 1.00                         
(6) Cost 0.04 0.14 0.05 0.07 0.04 1.00                       
(7) Efficiency 0.11 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.11 0.03 1.00                     
(8) Emission 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.08 1.00                   
(9) Environment 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.08 1.00                 
(10) Infrastructure 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.09 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.04 1.00               
(11) Market 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.11 1.00             
(12) Performance 0.07 0.14 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.07 1.00           
(13) Power 0.08 0.16 0.19 0.03 0.15 0.07 0.12 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.14 1.00         
(14) Range 0.10 0.14 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.19 0.14 1.00       
(15) Safety 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 1.00     
(16) Speed 0.06 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.15 0.04 0.15 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.14 0.19 0.03 1.00   
(17) Time 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.04 0.08 1.00 
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